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The United States Intelligence Community is tasked with providing the 
intelligence necessary to protect the homeland and U.S. interests abroad. Technology acts 
as a force multiplier for intelligence analysts, but that advantage also comes with 
substantial risk. The risk lies in our reliance on technology and processes, and the 
tradecraft of intelligence analysis and critical thinking appears to be losing relevance. 
During the intelligence analysis process, weak signals are often identified and then 
dismissed. In hindsight, these weak signals are realized as missed opportunities that 
could have allowed the Intelligence Community to mitigate the threat. This research 
examines cognitive bias from multiple perspectives and affirms that cognitive bias does 
influence intelligence analysis, and intelligence analysts need to understand the effects of 
cognitive bias. This research presents a recent case study and determines the negative 
influences of those biases had an impact on the decisions that were ultimately made 
in error. As a result of this research and analysis, several mitigation strategies are 
identified and included as recommendations to the Intelligence Community. These 
strategies present the United States with an opportunity to decrease the influences 
of cognitive bias on intelligence analysis, leading to a more effective and resilient 
Intelligence Community.  
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The intelligence cycle has remained unchanged since its inception following the 
end of World War II. The threats faced by the United States Intelligence Community 
today are very different from the threats of the past. Unlike those in the intelligence 
environment during the Cold War, the threats of today often come from terrorist 
organizations with allegiance to no single nation, state, or specific location. These 
dynamic threats require enhanced intelligence analysis that takes into account for the 
limitations of human cognitive performance.  
Intelligence analysis often reveals weak signals that can be difficult to discern. In 
hindsight, these weak signals are often identified as missed opportunities, which had they 
been recognized during the intelligence analysis process, could have provided the 
Intelligence Community with opportunities to mitigate the threat. This researcher’s 
hypothesis is that cognitive biases are mental roadblocks that prevent the identification of 
weak signals during the intelligence analysis process. This thesis presents research on 
human cognitive performance and decision making, defines the intelligence cycle, and 
explores the relationship between these topics.  
One of the challenges of this research was the very nature of intelligence 
activities. The infrequent failures of intelligence analysis are often debated in publicly 
available information sources and later scrutinized by Senate subcommittees. Those very 
few intelligence failures are offset by the many successes that, based on the nature of 
intelligence and the classification of documents are difficult to document. The United 
States Intelligence Community is considered one of the most effective in the world, 
although sharing those intelligence successes with the public does not occur very often 
due to the sensitivity of its activities.  
There is a significant amount of literature exploring cognitive bias, including 
books, journal articles, academic papers, and media articles. Those sources include 
literature from government organizations, the psychological and social sciences, 
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academia, and the private sector. Many of these sources provide examples of the negative 
effects of cognitive bias and note the need to account for those influences.  
Until recently, the Intelligence Community had very little literature related to 
cognitive bias and the effects on intelligence analysis. Following the tragic events of 
September 11, 2001, there are now many sources available that reference the need to 
account for the influences of cognitive bias in any effective intelligence analysis strategy. 
Some of the most respected and recognized names in the Intelligence Community agree 
that the influences of cognitive bias on intelligence analysis are significant, and these 
subject matter experts have contributed to this research.  
This thesis analyzes the recent terror attack in Benghazi against United States 
assets on September 11, 2012. The fatal mistakes can easily be correlated to a failure to 
recognize the effects of cognitive bias on intelligence analysis. Because of the many 
challenges in the Middle East, this thesis also includes a comparative study of the Israeli 
Intelligence Community. The use of a devil’s advocate office by the Israeli Intelligence 
Community is explored as a potential strategy that could be used by the United States 
Intelligence Community.  
This research explores and identifies potential mitigation strategies could be 
employed by the Intelligence Community to address the effects of cognitive bias on the 
intelligence cycle. Some of these mitigation strategies have been available to the 
Intelligence Community for some time, and others are considered emerging strategies 
under development today. Those potential mitigation strategies are grouped under the 
headings of psychological, analytical, and technological strategies. Furthermore, they 
include providing intelligence analysts with critical thinking skills/analytic tradecraft to 
recognize cognitive bias, the value of alternative analysis/external analysis, the use of 
structured analytical techniques, the employment of teams of analysts as opposed to 
analysts working alone, and the use of emerging software programs.  
This thesis posits that the intelligence cycle is influenced by cognitive bias. The 
research also supports the fact that humans do not have the ability to self-identify when 
those cognitive biases are influencing intelligence analysis and decision making. This is a 
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significant concern for the Intelligence Community, which is tasked with providing the 
intelligence required to protect this country; however, the Intelligence Community has 
not formally recognized the fact that cognitive bias has an effect on intelligence analysis. 
This research discovered no evidence to support any encouraging changes in an attempt 
to mitigate those effects in the intelligence analysis process. In addition, the Intelligence 
Community continues to provide very little cognitive bias training to new intelligence 
analysts. Additionally, this researcher found no evidence of any recurring training for 
analysts regarding the effects of cognitive bias. This is a significant issue and should be 
of great concern to the Intelligence Community. 
As a result of this research, recommendations include training intelligence 
analysts to recognize cognitive bias and develop strategies to address the effects, 
improving analyst critical thinking skills and analytic tradecraft, exploring the analyst 
team concept, determining if a structured analytic technique would improve the 
intelligence cycle, encouraging analysts to document all assumptions during intelligence 
analysis, and requiring analysts to include alternative assessments depending on the 
variables identified during the intelligence analysis process. 
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence recently released the 2016 
national counterintelligence strategy, which recommends the Intelligence Community 
focus efforts on anticipating, identifying, and warning of emerging threats. In addition, 
one of the recommendations is the development of relevant educational programs and 
opportunities to assist with the identification of those threats.1 The topic of this thesis is 
consistent with our most recent national counterintelligence strategy and provides an 
opportunity to contribute to our nation’s security. This thesis presents the Intelligence 
Community with recommendations to strengthen our nation’s intelligence analysis 
effectiveness to provide for more resilient intelligence analysis to better protect this 
nation and our interests abroad.  
                                                 
1 U.S. National Counterintelligence and Security Center, National Counterintelligence Strategy of the 
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I. INTRODUCTION 





Intelligence activities have always been an integral responsibility of nations and 
states tasked with protecting their people. In the earliest days of war, commanders would 
send soldiers to vantage points, usually high ground, to provide intelligence related to the 
movements of enemy forces. At that time, the only intelligence that could be relied upon 
was the view of the enemy, and those who controlled the high ground often had the 
advantage.  
Fast forward to the war on terrorism. Not only can we not see the movements of 
those who wish to do us harm, but in many cases, they do not align themselves with a 
particular nation, state, or specific location. Contemporary terrorist organizations are 
often comprised of the most religiously radicalized members, and in many cases, believe 
they have a responsibility to conduct “holy war” against their perceived enemies. Despite 
disagreement on the true definition of jihad,1 that Islamic word is used as a rallying cry 
for those who wish to do us harm.  
Resilient intelligence processes and activities now require much more than 
positional high ground. Technology has the ability to provide the Intelligence Community 
with situational high ground, but that advantage comes with substantial risk. The risk lies 
in our reliance on technology and processes, while the tradecraft of intelligence analysis 
and critical thinking appears to be losing relevance. For the Intelligence Community to 
protect our homeland and our interests abroad, intelligence analysts need to understand 
how cognitive biases influence analysis.  
                                                 
1 Islamic Supreme Council of America, “Jihad: A Misunderstood Concept from Islam—What Jihad Is, 
and Is Not,” accessed April 15, 2016, http://islamicsupremecouncil.org/understanding-islam/legal-
rulings/5-jihad-a-misunderstood-concept-from-islam.html?start=9. 
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The term “cognitive bias,” first introduced by Amos Tversky and Daniel 
Kahneman in the 1970s, was used to describe a person’s systematic but flawed patterns 
of response to both judgment and decision problems.2 Research on the effects of 
cognitive bias on the decision-making process has increased steadily since then and has 
gained significant influence in the psychological literature. This is an important 
consideration when thinking about intelligence analysis. There is a significant amount of 
literature exploring cognitive bias, including books, journal articles, academic papers, and 
media articles. The sources for this literature review include works from the Intelligence 
Community (IC), other government organizations, the psychological and social sciences, 
academia, and the private sector. Many of these sources provide examples of the negative 
effects of cognitive bias and discuss the need to account for those influences. 
Intelligence analysis often reveals the presence of weak signals that can be 
difficult to detect. In hindsight, these weak signals are often identified as missed 
opportunities, which had they been recognized during the intelligence analysis process, 
could have provided the IC with opportunities to mitigate the threat. This researcher’s 
hypothesis is that cognitive biases are mental roadblocks preventing the identification of 
weak signals during the intelligence analysis process. A secondary research question is 
what mitigation strategies could be employed by the IC to recognize cognitive biases in 
order to better protect our homeland? 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
The IC comprises 17 agencies within the Executive Branch, many of which work 
to collect and analyze the intelligence necessary to support our national security 
activities.3 Most of the IC defines the intelligence cycle as the process governing how 
                                                 
2 Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases,” 
Stanford University, 1974, http://statweb.stanford.edu/~cgates/PERSI/Courses/Phil166-266/TverskyK-
HeuristicsBiases.pdf, 1124.  
3 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Intelligence Community,” accessed January 9, 2015, 
http://www.dni.gov/index.php. 
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intelligence should be collected, integrated, evaluated, analyzed, and disseminated.4 The 
intelligence cycle presents opportunities at every step for the negative effects of cognitive 
bias to influence the analysis.  
Intelligence analysis often results in the presence of weak signals that can be 
difficult to distinguish. In hindsight, these weak signals are often identified as missed 
opportunities, which had they been recognized during the analytical exploitation process, 
could have provided the IC with opportunities to mitigate the threat. This researcher’s 
hypothesis is that cognitive biases prevent the identification of weak signals during the 
intelligence analysis process.  
Until recently, there was very little literature related to cognitive bias and the 
effects on intelligence analysis. A great deal of literature after September 11, 2001 (9/11) 
references the need to account for the influences of cognitive bias in any effective 
intelligence model. Many experts agree the influences of cognitive bias are significant, 
and these subject matter experts, including Richards Heuer, Mark Lowenthal, Dr. Erik 
Dahl, and Dr. James Wirtz, have contributed to the available literature. There is no open 
source evidence of any mitigation strategies currently employed by the IC to address this 
issue. In addition, it appears the amount of time spent training new intelligence analysts 
about the effects of cognitive bias has remained unchanged; it is still very little.  
The complexity of today’s fight against terrorism demands the best efforts in this 
dynamic threat environment with resilient intelligence programs providing analysts with 
the tools and training required to be effective and successful. This thesis provides the IC 
with cognitive bias mitigation strategies and recommendations that, if followed, will 
result in significant improvements to the intelligence analysis process. For agencies in the 
IC, see Figure 1.   
                                                 
4 Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Fusion Center Guidelines: Developing and 
Sharing Information and Intelligence in a New Era (Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2006), 
https://it.ojp.gov/documents/fusion_center_guidelines_law_enforcement.pdf. 
  4 





The following agencies make up the IC: 
• Air Force Intelligence 
• Army Intelligence 
• Central Intelligence Agency 
• Coast Guard Intelligence 
• Defense Intelligence Agency 
• Department of Energy 
• Department of Homeland Security 
• Department of State 
• Department of the Treasury 
                                                 
5 Source: Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Public Affairs Office, “IC Science and 
Technology: Opportunities for Small Business Engagement,” 2014, 
http://www.slideshare.net/GTSCoalition/odni-dr-honey-small-business, slide 5.  
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• Drug Enforcement Administration 
• Federal Bureau of Investigation 
• Marine Corps Intelligence 
• National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency 
• National Reconnaissance Office 
• National Security Agency 
• Navy Intelligence 
 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is what is the effect of cognitive bias on the 
intelligence cycle. To answer this question, this thesis studies cognitive bias and decision 
making, the intelligence cycle, and the effects of the relationship between these topics. 
This research also explores case studies in which the intelligence failures can be 
correlated to the IC failing to recognize the effects of cognitive bias. 
A secondary research question is what mitigation strategies could be employed by 
the IC to address the effects of cognitive bias on the intelligence cycle. This question is 
answered through this research by exploring mitigation strategies that have been 
available to the IC for some time as well as cutting-edge strategies under development 
today.  
D. SIGNIFICANCE TO THE FIELD 
Following the events of 9/11, there was a reorganization of the IC and a 
significant increase of resources made available to the IC agencies. Despite the changes, 
the IC continues to struggle with the identification of weak signals. The intelligence 
analysis model used by the IC is the intelligence cycle, and the current model does not 
account for the limitations of human cognitive performance. Although there have been 
intelligence analysis improvements, such as advancements to information sharing 
capabilities and better leveraging of technologies, there are opportunities for 
improvement. This thesis provides an introduction to the issue, background information, 
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and relevant research from a variety of sources coupled with recommendations moving 
forward.  
E. LIMITATIONS 
One of the many challenges of this research was the difficulty of accessing 
information regarding the IC. This research was forced to rely on open source 
information to connect the dots to support the hypothesis. However, this research does 
not include current strategies employed by the IC to address this issue due to the 
unavailability or non-existence of any literature documenting those strategies. In addition, 
it appears the amount of time spent training new intelligence analysts about the effects of 
cognitive bias has remained unchanged; it is still very little. 
F. THESIS OUTLINE AND UPCOMING CHAPTERS 
Chapter II covers the literature review and provides sources of information, 
including the IC, other government organizations, the psychological and social sciences, 
the private sector, and academia. Chapter III presents the historical perspective of 
cognitive psychology to provide an understanding of cognitive bias, psychological 
significance of cognitive bias, the relevance of cognitive bias awareness, and relevant 
research on how humans process information. Chapter IV discusses the intelligence cycle 
as a system, explores how cognitive bias creeps into the intelligence analysis process, 
presents the national intelligence estimate process, and provides an example of cognitive 
bias involving the IC via the study of a recent tragedy (Benghazi). Chapter V discusses 
potential mitigation strategies, and lastly Chapter VI ends with findings, 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
All our understanding begins with the senses, proceeds then to the understanding, 





Research on the effects of cognitive bias on the decision-making process has 
increased steadily since the term was first coined in the 1970s and has gained significant 
influence in the psychological literature. There is a significant amount of literature, 
including books, journal articles, academic papers, and media articles, exploring 
cognitive bias. The sources for this literature review include works by the IC, other 
government organizations, the psychological and social sciences, academia, and the 
private sector. Only a few of these sources provide examples of the negative effects of 
cognitive bias and the need to account for those influences. 
Until recently, the IC published little literature or remained relatively silent on the 
implications of cognitive bias and the effects on intelligence analysis. This thesis 
identifies and examines the post-9/11 recognition of the influence of cognitive bias in the 
overall intelligence cycle from collection requirements through dissemination. This 
research does not, however, include current strategies employed by the IC to address this 
issue or implications due to the unavailability of any public literature documenting IC 
internal strategies.  
B. DEFINING THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE 
The intelligence model currently used by the IC is called the “intelligence cycle.” 
A review of the literature indicates the intelligence cycle had its beginnings as a result of 
  8 
the National Security Act of 1947.6 Following World War II and because of the missed 
weak signals prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the United States (U.S.) realized a 
more formal intelligence framework was needed and that model would need to allow for 
separation between “signals and noise.”7  
Following 9/11, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 
(IRTPA) was passed to reform the IC and intelligence-related activities of the U.S. 
government.8 This law recognizes the intelligence cycle as fundamental to the 
intelligence analysis process and dictates open source intelligence be included in the 
process. The act also reorganized the IC and established the Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence (ODNI). The IRTPA legislation remains in effect today and is 
recognized as the most fundamental change to the IC since 1947.9  
In 2002, Congress passed the Homeland Security Act, and this created the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).10 The purpose for this legislation is to prevent 
terrorist attacks in the United States, reduce our vulnerabilities, strengthen our 
infrastructure against attacks, and provide a process for recovery following a terrorist 
attack. It also provides the secretary of DHS the authority for conducting investigations 
following a terrorist attack on U.S. soil and the responsibility to prevent those attacks 
from ever occurring. 
                                                 
6 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “National Security Agency Act of 1947,” accessed 
June 24, 2015, http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/ic-legal-reference-book-2012/ref-book-
1947-national-security-act. 
7 Central Intelligence Agency, “Intelligence Throughout History: The Impact of Pearl Harbor,” last 
updated April 30, 2013, https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/2010-featured-story-
archive/pearl-harbor.html.  
8 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458 (2004), 
http://www.nctc.gov/docs/irtpa.pdf. 
9 Michael Jacobson, “The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act: Addressing 
Controversies, Expanding Powers,” Policy No. 929, Washington Institute, December 17, 2004, 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/the-intelligence-reform-and-terrorism-prevention-
act-addressing-controversi.  
10 Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296 (2002), 
http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/hr_5005_enr.pdf. 
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Different departments define the intelligence cycle a little differently. For 
example, the Department of Justice (DOJ) and DHS both refer to the intelligence cycle as 
intelligence that should be collected, integrated, evaluated, analyzed, and disseminated.11 
The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) also utilizes an intelligence cycle and defines it as 
the planning/direction, collection, processing, analysis/production, and dissemination of 
intelligence.12 Additionally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provides a 
definition and an explanation for each step in the intelligence cycle similar to most of the 
IC. Those steps include the requirements, planning/direction, collection, 
processing/exploitation, analysis/production, and dissemination.13 The FBI defines 
analysis as the conversion of raw information into intelligence.14 
The intelligence cycle presents opportunities at every step for the negative effects 
of cognitive bias to influence the analysis. Figure 2 is relatively a relatively consistent 
flow diagram used by all of the IC. What is lacking in this model is a structure that forces 
the intelligence analyst to account for assumptions, biases, and/or make analysis 
adjustments should any new information be discovered during the intelligence analysis 
process.  
                                                 
11 Office of Justice Programs, Fusion Center Guidelines.  
12 Central Intelligence Agency, “The Intelligence Cycle,” accessed July 3, 2015, 
https://www.cia.gov/kids-page/6-12th-grade/who-we-are-what-we-do/the-intelligence-cycle.html.  
13 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Intelligence Cycle,” accessed July 3, 2015, 
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/intelligence-cycle. 
14 Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Intelligence Defined,” accessed July 3, 
2015, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/defined. 
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Figure 2.  Federal Bureau of Investigation—Intelligence Cycle15 
  
 
C. DEFINING THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE ANALYSIS PROCESS 
The intelligence cycle specifies the steps in the process, and the intelligence 
analysis process is how each of those steps is used by intelligence analysts working 
toward an intelligence product. The reliability and significance of the information is 
evaluated, put into context, and used to produce an intelligence product. Raw intelligence 
is analyzed and finished intelligence reports result in providing background and an 
assessment about the significance of the find. One of the most important functions of 
intelligence analysis is reducing the uncertainty present in all sources of information by 
seeking an edge over adversaries; effective intelligence analysis provides those 
opportunities. In this thesis, the intelligence analysis process is described using the 
intelligence cycle model for proper context.  
Intelligence analysis can be tactical, operational, or strategic. Strategic 
intelligence is of great value to policy makers because it provides the information 
required to make decisions affecting U.S. national security now and well into the future. 
Strategic intelligence requires access to sources of information from many different 
                                                 
15 From: Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Intelligence Cycle,” accessed July 3, 2015, 
https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/intelligence-cycle.  
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disciplines, including the military, politics, and economics, and considers the 
relationships between societies and technological developments.16 Strategic intelligence 
analysis is a long-term, dynamic process.  
Tactical and operational intelligence maintains a focus on current or dynamic 
events. This type of intelligence can be used to measure current objectives, operations, or 
programs, and it does not attempt to specifically achieve any long-term projections.17 A 
majority of the intelligence analysis activities support operational intelligence with the 
objective of providing decision makers with timely, accurate, and relevant information.18 
The first step in the process is the requirements or the information needed by the 
decision makers. The U.S. national requirements are established by the director of 
national intelligence (DNI) following direction provided by the president of the United 
States (POTUS) and national security advisors.19 These requirements serve to protect the 
U.S. from national security threats and are the basis for national security policy. This is 
the first step in the process and sets the direction for the rest of the analysis process. The 
specific information required, how that information will be collected, and determining 
how soon it is needed are all important factors at this early stage of the process. A 
prepared collection plan may include seeking intelligence partners to assist with the 
analysis. The consumer dictates the requirements and answers any clarification questions 
the intelligence analyst may have. Once the intelligence analyst understands the 
requirements and has a plan, the next step is collection.  
Collection is referred to as the gathering of raw information and data according to 
the national security requirements and sharing that information with other analysis 
elements. Moreover, collection guidelines may be established to in order to provide 
optimal use of the intelligence resources to meet the consumer requirements. Specific 
                                                 
16 Federation of American Scientists, “Operations Security-Intelligence Threat Handbook,” Section 2, 
1996, accessed March 11, 2016, http://fas.org/irp/nsa/ioss/threat96/part02.htm.  
17 Ibid. 
18 Office of Naval Intelligence, “Nimitz Operational Intelligence Center,” accessed May 23, 2016, 
http://www.oni.navy.mil/This-is-ONI/Who-We-Are/Nimitz. 
19 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Intelligence Cycle.”  
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requests may be disseminated to other collection sources to avoid duplication of efforts. 
Providing opportunities for redundancy can assist with verification that the intelligence 
and data collected is accurate and can either prove or disprove an intelligence 
assessment.20 Collection activities occur in dynamic environments and rely upon secure 
communications to quickly move and share that information. 
Collection sources involve many different activities including human sources 
operations, the use of technology, and the sharing of intelligence among our intelligence 
partners.21 There are many sources available for the collection of intelligence, and the 
types most relevant to intelligence analysis include human intelligence, signals 
intelligence, imagery intelligence, open source intelligence, and measurement and 
signatures intelligence (see Table 1).  
Table 1.   Types of Intelligence22 
Type Acronym Definition 
Human intelligence HUMINT Intelligence collected from human sources and 
associated with clandestine activities, although 
primarily involves the use of covert actions performed 
to collect that intelligence 
Signals intelligence SIGINT Signal intercepts of electronic transmissions collected 
by ground sites, ships, aircraft, and other covert 
operations and activities 
Imagery intelligence IMINT Intelligence collected from images reproduced 




OSINT Generally publicly available information that can 
provide information on processes and activities relevant 
to intelligence agencies and adversaries 
Measurement and 
signatures intelligence 
MASINT Advances processing of intelligence gathered through 
IMINT and SIGINT to analyze weapons capabilities and 
industrial movement 
                                                 
20 Federation of American Scientists, “Operations Security-Intelligence.” 
21 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Intelligence Cycle.”  
22 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Intelligence Branch, “Intelligence Collection Disciplines,” 
accessed April 20, 2016, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/intelligence/disciplines. 
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These different collection sources of intelligence can be grouped together and 
referred to as all source intelligence. According to the journal article titled “A Guide to 
All-Source Intelligence,” the previous methods of considering agencies and analysts as 
single sources is no longer practical.23 The outdated concept of single sources correlates 
to the exhaustively documented IC issue of working in silos. Instead of working with 
siloed information, agencies and analysts need to have the ability to access information 
from multiple disciplines to allow every chance of success. Sharing information and 
intelligence across intelligence sources can provide context and a better understanding of 
the analysis at hand.  
Although the technology available today has enabled the IC to collect 
unprecedented amounts of data, heavily relying on technology comes with risk. The IC 
should remain vigilant for collection errors that the technology could result in and should 
continue to verify the intelligence collected by those technologies. The risk of technology 
bias, based on the capabilities of technology as a collection strategy, could potentially 
result in errors with great consequences.24 These all-source types of intelligence are 
routinely collected by the IC during the collection portion of the intelligence cycle. 
Although much of this intelligence is collected via technology, human intelligence 
(HUMINT) remains a very relevant collection strategy today.  
This collection step of the intelligence cycle is critical in meeting the tactical, 
operational, and/or strategic objectives of the IC. As a result, much of the intelligence 
work occurs at this stage of the process. Once all of the intelligence is collected and 
secured, it then needs to be processed and exploited.  
Processing and exploitation involves a tremendous amount of data that must be 
converted into a suitable format to enable the production of intelligence. Much of that 
information must be initially processed using technology, software programs, and 
specific techniques such as translations, decrypting data, and determining which of the 
                                                 
23 Thomas Fingar, “A Guide to All-Source Analysis,” Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies 19, no. 2 
(2012): 63.   
24 Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1976), 156.  
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data is relevant and which has no value.25 Once the information is vetted, it must be 
entered into databases to allow for the efficient exploitation during the intelligence 
analysis process. Once the intelligence is formatted, it can be used to manipulate the raw 
data into finished intelligence products. After that, the next step in the intelligence cycle 
is the analysis and production of intelligence. 
Analysis and production is the process of making sense of the raw information 
and transforming it into intelligence assessments through the integration, evaluation, and 
analyzation of the data.26 The information is vetted to determine if it is valid, relevant, 
and reliable. Intelligence can be misleading on purpose, and this fact must be considered 
during this phase of the process. Now that the individual bits of information have been 
collected, the information is connected to provide context and assist with a clearer 
operating picture and determination of relevance.  
For the intelligence to be considered effective, it needs to be objective, timely, 
and accurate.27 The analysis and production process attempts to eliminate erroneous or 
unsupported data. The analytical efforts sometimes results in the need for additional 
collection efforts to close the gaps in analysis. The goal is to complete this step in the 
process with actionable intelligence that has value to the consumer and is ready for 
dissemination. 
Dissemination is the final step in the intelligence cycle analysis process and 
represents the conveyance to the consumer who initially requested the information. This 
final step usually involves the electronic transfer of that intelligence product, although 
that step could include verbal reports to the consumer and providing access to relevant 
databases. This phase of the process can lead to additional intelligence requirement 
requests, depending on the products received by the consumer. Intelligence analysis can 
lead to tactical, operational, and/or strategic decisions by understanding what is known, 
what is not known, and probabilities of future actions.  
                                                 
25 Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Intelligence Cycle.”  
26 Ibid.  
27 Federation of American Scientists, “Operations Security-Intelligence.”  
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In general, research indicates intelligence analysts have specific educational 
requirements and receive specific training concerning the intelligence cycle and 
preparation of intelligence products. However, there does not appear to be consistent 
standards across the IC on what exactly that education and training should include. 
Would that fact of lack of consistency reduce or enhance susceptibility to the effects of 
cognitive bias? 
D. INTELLIGENCE ANALYST TRAINING PROGRAMS 
There are many intelligence analyst training programs offered by government, 
colleges, and private institutions. One of the consistencies with all of these programs is 
the short amount of time spent addressing cognitive bias, resulting in a lack of analyst 
awareness at the crucial beginning stages of their careers. Some of the programs 
discovered in the research are described in following paragraphs.  
In 2010, the DOJ released a document titled Common Competencies for State, 
Local, and Tribal Intelligence Analysts.28 The guide identifies essential analytic 
competencies expected of state, local, and tribal intelligence analysts working in major 
urban area fusion centers, and the target audience is fusion directors. The analytic skill 
behavioural indicators deemed important include generating and testing multiple 
hypotheses, challenging key assumptions, avoiding common fallacies, and evaluating the 
quality of critical thinking.29 These indicators are essential for intelligence analysts to 
understand the effects of cognitive bias and the importance of analytical reasoning. 
The DHS Intelligence Training Branch teaches the Basic Intelligence and Threat 
Analysis Course (BITAC).30 Module 2, Lesson 3 of this course covers critical thinking 
                                                 
28 Department of Justice, Common Competencies for State, Local, and Tribal Intelligence Analysts 
(Washington, DC: Department of Justice, 2010), 
https://www.ncirc.gov/documents/public/common_competencies_state_local_and_Tribal_intelligence_anal
ysts.pdf.  
29 Ibid., 5. 
30 Department of Homeland Security, Intelligence Training Branch, “Training Requirements and 
Approved Course Catalogues,” accessed April 20, 2016, http://www.dhs.gov/fema-approved-intelligence-
analyst-training-courses. 
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and analytic methods/cognitive errors and memory.31 This section of the basic course 
instructs analysts on “cognitive errors” (they do not use the term “cognitive bias” due to 
the term’s alleged potential for being confused with “prejudice”). Approximately 2.5 
hours of the six-week (240-hour) basic course are dedicated to this section covering 
cognitive biases. Research into the DHS training program has not yielded any evidence of 
ongoing training regarding cognitive errors.  
Through the Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, the International 
Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts (IALEIA) offers the Basic 
Criminal Intelligence Analysis (BCIA) training course along with many other intelligence 
courses.32 The IALEIA follows the training recommendations outlined in the DOJ’s 
Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training Standards for Law Enforcement and Other 
Criminal Justice Agencies in the United States.33 A review of those standards reveals 
intelligence analysts and intelligence officers/collectors receive the same training (180 
minutes total) in subject matter consisting of critical thinking/fallacies of logic/inference 
development.34  
This is the only subject matter of IC agency courses that most closely resembles 
cognitive bias awareness. Interestingly, IC intelligence managers do not appear to receive 
any training relating to cognitive bias, and this is an identified gap in training standards. 
Intelligence managers may experience difficulties holding employees accountable 
regarding the influences of cognitive bias if they do not understand what those effects 
might be. The DOJ intelligence training standards document includes responses to a 
                                                 
31 Department of Homeland Security, “Intelligence Training Branch, “Critical Thinking and Analytic 
Methods” (unpublished course material, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, DC), Module 2-
Lesson 3.    
32 International Association of Law Enforcement Intelligence Analysts, “Basic Criminal Intelligence 
Analysis Training,” accessed January 9, 2016, http://www.ialeia.org/certification/basic-criminal-
intelligence-analysis-training.html.  
33 Department of Justice, Minimum Criminal Intelligence Training Standards for Law Enforcement 
and Other Criminal Justice Agencies in the United States: Findings and Recommendations (Washington, 
DC: Department of Justice, 2004), 
https://it.ojp.gov/documents/minimum_criminal_intel_training_standards.pdf.  
34 Ibid., 7, 29. 
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questionnaire from a majority of the responding law enforcement agencies and states 
intelligence analysts and intelligence managers lack adequate training.35 It would appear 
logical that 180 minutes out of six weeks of time dedicated to understanding of the 
effects of cognitive bias on intelligence analysis remains insufficient. 
The Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis is the premier training center 
for CIA analysts.36 The intelligence analysis course consists of 11 weeks of instruction 
followed by five weeks in an interim assignment. The course has a module that alerts 
intelligence analysts to the risks of assumptions and biases in both their own analysis and 
the analysis by others during the intelligence process.37 Due to the classified nature of the 
specific training curriculum, the only available information was retrieved from open 
source government reports, including the review by the U.S. Senate on the intelligence 
failures of pre-war access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by Iraq. This 
researcher was unable to obtain training specifics from the Sherman Kent School. 
The Department of Defense (DOD) National Intelligence University (NIU) offers 
degrees in various intelligence disciplines to members of the armed forces and federal 
government employees. The academic programs work to support the IC mission by 
educating, researching, and providing outreach.38 The university offers intelligence 
reasoning and analysis courses, although this researcher was unable to access any of the 
specifics of the programs. It does appear NIU is aware of the influences of cognitive bias 
and provides some context for it to its students. 
                                                 
35 Ibid., D2. 
36 Central Intelligence Agency, Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis, “Offices of the CIA, 
Training Resources,” accessed November 20, 2015, https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/intelligence-
analysis/training-resources.html.  
37 Senate Committee on Intelligence Report on US Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence 
Assessment on Iraq (Washington, DC: U.S. Senate, 2004), http://web.mit.edu/simsong/www/iraqreport2-
textunder.pdf, 6. 
38 National Intelligence University, “About NIU,” accessed January 10, 2016, http://ni-
u.edu/wp/about-niu/.  
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E. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY PERSPECTIVE 
According to Richards Heuer in his book Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 
“Weaknesses and biases [are] inherent in human thinking processes … [they] can be 
alleviated by conscious application of tools and techniques that should be in the 
analytical tradecraft toolkit of all intelligence analysts.”39 Heuer’s book is recommended 
reading for all perspective intelligence analysts by the National Intelligence University.40 
As a long-time employee of the CIA, Heuer recognizes the limitations and 
influences of cognitive bias. He suggests there are strategies to mitigate those effects, and 
intelligence analysts should be aware of those strategies to avoid missing weak signals.41 
For example, to avoid anchoring bias, Heuer suggests that the intelligence analyst must 
rethink the problem from the very beginning and assume none of the judgments from the 
previous analyst are entirely accurate.42 In addition, Heuer suggests analysts should ask 
themselves that if the opposite outcome had occurred following the analysis process, 
would the analyst be surprised.43 This suggestion is consistent with requiring intelligence 
analysts to develop alternative assessments based on the different variables identified. 
Dr. Steve Yetiv has been recognized by the DOD, Harvard University, and many 
other influential institutions as an intelligence expert on decision making and foreign 
policy. Dr. Yetiv describes cognitive biases as mental blind spots often leading to errors, 
and he is particularly concerned with confirmation bias and anchoring bias.44 Those 
biases are consistent with the research completed by IC experts identified in this thesis. 
Dr. Yetiv describes these cognitive biases and demonstrates how they distort judgments, 
                                                 
39 Richards Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of 
Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999), 1. 
40 National Intelligence University, “Recommended Reading Lists,” accessed September 7, 2015, 
http://ni-u.edu/wp/recommended-readings/. 
41 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, Chapter 14. 
42 Ibid., 152. 
43 Ibid., 177. 
44 Steve A. Yetiv, National Security through a Cockeyed Lens (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2013), 2. 
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result in faulty intelligence assessments, and are often attributed to analytical errors.45 
His book National Security through a Cockeyed Lens studies five episodes in U.S. 
history, including the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, in which cognitive biases influenced 
the foreign policy decision-making process. 
Jack Davis is a research fellow at the CIA Kent School and has previously served 
as an analyst, manager, course director, and researcher on analytic tradecraft. His white 
paper titled Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning makes 
recommendations to improve the analysis process.46 Some of his recommendations 
include forcing intelligence analysts to utilize alternative analyses, understanding the skill 
of challenging personal assumptions, and providing for a thorough evaluation of the 
authenticity of classified as well as open source information.47 These recommendations 
are consistent with the need to address cognitive biases throughout the intelligence 
analysis process. 
The ODNI is aware that cognitive bias can lead to errors in the intelligence 
analysis process. In partnership with its research and development branch, the ODNI is 
working with the Intelligence Advanced Research Projects Activity (IARPA) on the 
Integrated Cognitive-neuroscience Architectures for Understanding Sensemaking 
(ICArUS) project. The research is attempting to identify the cognitive biases that can 
compromise effective intelligence analysis by intelligence analysts.48 
Sensemaking is defined as the process humans use to provide the ability to give 
meaning to environments.49 Humans have the ability to detect patterns in the world and 
to provide meaning to those patterns. As an example, a fighter pilot operating in 
international airspace near enemy territory needs to be able to maintain hypersensitive 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 95. 
46 Jack Davis, Improving CIA Analytic Performance: Strategic Warning (Occasional Papers, no. 1) 
(Washington DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2002), 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cia/strategic_warning_kent.htm.  
47 Ibid. 
48 Davis, Improving CIA Analytic Performance.   
49 Ibid. 
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situational awareness regarding potential threats, location, the rules of engagement, and 
many other factors. In addition, the pilot needs to be able to manage all of these stimuli 
under difficult conditions with extreme consequences for any errors made. The ICArUS 
sensemaking model currently being developed could provide the IC with software that 
has the ability to mirror human cognitive performance without the limitations of 
cognitive bias. 
Mark Lowenthal is an intelligence expert and scholar. In his book Intelligence: 
From Secrets to Policy, he discusses the intelligence cycle and presents the most common 
diagram, the CIA model.50 In addition, Lowenthal talks about opportunities for 
improvement through a revised intelligence cycle diagram that more clearly represents 
the actual process used by intelligence analysts.51 Lowenthal also provides context by 
explaining that at any point in the intelligence analysis process, the analyst may have to 
return to a previous step if new information is developed. He cites the reasons 
backtracking could occur, including if new information discovered, presented, or 
feedback forces change. Furthermore, Lowenthal proposes a revised intelligence cycle 
that is much more complex and is linear, circular, and open-ended, all at the same time.52  
Jeffrey Cooper, the Director for the Center for Information Strategy and Policy at 
Science Applications International Corporation, served on the Presidential Commission 
on Future Intelligence Capabilities, and is recognized as an intelligence analysis expert. 
His paper titled Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intelligence 
Analysis, published by the Center for the Study of Intelligence, talks about 
professionalizing the intelligence analysis process.53 Cooper stresses the need to balance 
inductive and deductive reasoning and the importance of not losing sight of 
                                                 
50 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 6th ed. (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 
2015), 83.  
51 Ibid. 
52 Ibid., 88. 
53 Jeffrey R. Cooper, Curing Analytic Pathologies: Pathways to Improved Intelligence Analysis 
(Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005), https://fas.org/irp/cia/product/curing.pdf, 46. 
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imagination.54 His paper points out a series of strategic and operational failures by the IC 
and assigns some of the blame for those errors to cognitive bias. Moreover, Cooper 
stresses that self-awareness and redundancy built into the intelligence analysis process is 
critical to improve analytical performance. IC managers must be aware of potential 
analyst biases when reviewing the process and resulting assessments. Finally, Cooper 
references potentially using a “process watcher” to bring a clear, bias-free view to the 
analysis process.55 
Dr. Rob Johnston is an ethnographer specializing in cultural anthropology. He has 
been a researcher at the Institute for Defense Analysis and a director of the Central 
Intelligence Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the CIA’s Center for the Study of 
Intelligence where he currently is on staff. His book, Analytic Culture of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study, includes interviews with approximately 
500 members, including many intelligence analysts, and it is recommended reading for 
all perspective intelligence analysts by the DOD National Intelligence University.56 
Johnston views the problems with the IC and the intelligence cycle as being 
related to the IC culture and asserts that the pressures placed on intelligence analysts by 
the IC management result in exaggerated cognitive bias.57 Johnston is particularly 
concerned about confirmation bias, and his research resulted in confirmation that the first 
step of the intelligence process was to research prior intelligence produced by that agency 
and apply that information into the new analysis.58 He asserts the problem with this 
technique is that the previous analysis may have been based on a cognitive bias and/or 
faulty hypothesis. The intelligence analyst would then begin the intelligence cycle with a 
cognitive bias already positioned within the process. Furthermore, Johnston stresses the 
                                                 
54 Ibid., 45. 
55 Ibid., 8. 
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need to understand cognitive bias as a step toward improving intelligence analysis and 
leading to an improved intelligence model.59 
Jennifer Sims and Burton Gerber both have extensive experience in the IC and 
subscribe to the team intelligence analysis concept. In their book Transforming US 
Intelligence, the authors articulate the extensive challenges of mitigating cognitive bias in 
the IC. Additionally, the authors state that the relationship between analysis and the 
influences of cognitive bias can result in the production of faulty intelligence estimates, 
and they identify the need to employ a resilient strategy to address those issues.60 The 
authors also recommend analytic teams of experts be formed from many disciplines of 
the IC to be responsible for “community products,” similar to national intelligence 
estimates (NIE).61 This strategy is consistent with the recommendations of other subject 
matter experts and presents an opportunity for the recognition of cognitive biases. 
Furthermore, this strategy may assist with the separation of signals from the noise.  
Lawrence Woocher is a senior program officer at the United States Institute of 
Peace and specializes in conflict assessment and intelligence analysis. In his article titled 
“The Effects of Cognitive Biases on Early Warning and Response,” Woocher proposes 
cognitive biases can weaken efforts by the IC to identify weak signals in the intelligence 
analysis process.62 He suggests that cognitive bias reduces human cognitive performance 
by limiting the ability to detect weak signals present in seemingly random events and the 
potential for small changes to have a significant impact.63 
Woocher asserts that humans remember occurrences much more readily than they 
remember non-occurrences.64 As an example, most people remember where they were 
                                                 
59 Ibid., 21. 
60 Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber, Transforming US Intelligence (Washington, DC: Georgetown 
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61 Ibid., 124. 
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when the 9/11 tragedy occurred, as opposed to where they were when a terrorism 
warning that did not occur was broadcast. Intelligence analysts may assign greater 
significance on the previous analysis of a terrorist attack that actually occurred when 
compared with the analysis from an attack that did not occur. Heuer appears to agree 
when he stated that the more details known by an intelligence analyst from a prior 
scenario, the easier it is to construct a new scenario from imagination, leading to a higher 
perceived probability.65 
Woocher recommends education and training as the most effective means of 
mitigating the effects of cognitive biases, and he cautions that analysts must be aware of 
the tendency to leverage a cognitive bias, thinking it might minimize the effects of 
another.66 Consistent with this research, Woocher suggests implementing a more 
rigorous intelligence analysis structure to manage cognitive biases. An effective 
intelligence model must allow for externalization of the intelligence analysis process to 
provide opportunities for an independent review of that analysis and the possibility of 
detecting any biases. 
In her book Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, Cynthia Grabo 
suggests that intelligence failures are not the result of cognitive biases and provides 
alternative hypotheses for those failures.67 Grabo was a senior intelligence analyst for the 
Army and the Defense Intelligence Agency and is recognized as an expert in strategic 
warning. She suggests that reasons for failures include insufficient examination of 
evidence by the intelligence analysts, basing analysis on preconceptions as opposed to 
facts, the IC explaining weak signals away, and analysts failing to believe what the 
intelligence analysis is clearly leading to as the causes of almost every warning failure.68 
Consistent with this research, Grabo warns that reliance on prior experiences over facts is 
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a common error resulting in warning failures and that analysts often place more 
significance on interpretations of prior experiences than the facts in hand.69 This is 
consistent with prior research and could be interpreted as confirmation bias. 
F. PRIVATE SECTOR INTELLIGENCE PERSPECTIVE 
This research discovered a number of private organizations that process 
intelligence. Business Executives for National Security (BENS) is a non-profit 
organization and serves as a means for senior level executives to assist with strengthening 
our national security and improving the performance of government agencies involved in 
that mission.70 The BENS Practitioners Panel includes well-respected members of the IC. 
Some of those members include the former Secretary of DHS Michael Chertoff, former 
CIA and National Security Agency (NSA) Director Michael Hayden, and the former 
Director of the National Counterterrorism Center Michael Leiter.  
The BENS 2014 report titled Domestic Security: Confronting a Changing Threat 
to Ensure Public Safety and Civil Liberties contains recommendations to the IC. One of 
the key recommendations states, “The ODNI, in consultation with the FBI and DHS, 
should develop and apply analytic standards, training protocols, and common systems 
and vernacular to underwrite standardized training for all federal domestic 
counterterrorism analysts.”71 This research supports that statement and the importance of 
updating and applying consistent and relevant training to the entire IC.  
The Walt Disney Company employs intelligence analysts at its properties around 
the world. It has a global intelligence and threat analysis support team providing 
“strategic intelligence, threat assessments, vulnerability mitigation strategies and in-depth 
analytical products covering existing and developing threats that include counter 
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terrorism, physical threats, cyber-attacks and all reputational risks…”72 The 
responsibilities for these positions are remarkably similar to those of the IC, especially 
those that focus on the collection and production of estimates to counter potential 
threats.73  
Similar to Walt Disney Company, the Target Corporation also employs analysts 
for its cyber threat intelligence operations.74 The responsibilities of these analysts include 
the “collection, analysis and dissemination of technical cyber threat intelligence.”75 
These two private corporations serve as examples of how intelligence analysis is no 
longer just a government function and how it presents the private sector with the same 
challenges and opportunities as the IC. 
Lockheed Martin offers intelligence analysis training through its Center for 
Security Analysis.76 The critical thinking training includes understanding cognitive biases 
and how they negatively impact the critical thinking process, analytic judgments, and 
training in structured analytic techniques for the purpose of countering and defeating 
terrorism.77 The Lockheed Martin intelligence training covers the traditional intelligence 
cycle as well as the challenges associated with a dynamic and asymmetric threat analysis. 
Moreover, the course teaches the analyst how to produce intelligence products in 
accordance with existing IC needs. This Lockheed Martin program appears to be on the 
cutting edge of intelligence analysis training and should be evaluated more closely to 
determine whether or not the IC would benefit from these modern training topics offered 
by the private sector. 
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G. ACADEMIC PERSPECTIVE 
Dr. James Wirtz is a recognized intelligence expert and Dean of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s International Graduate Studies Program. According to a Defense 
Media Network interview with Dr. Wirtz, he explained the intelligence cycle currently 
used by the IC does not account for the influences of cognitive bias and results in a 
limitation on intelligence analysis effectiveness.78 Also during the interview, Dr. Wirtz 
states that if we know what people are thinking, we can anticipate their actions despite 
the presence of information that might dictate an alternative action.79 Dr. Wirtz goes on 
to say humans are more willing to receive information confirming their beliefs and more 
reluctant to accept information not consistent with those beliefs.80 Those statements are 
consistent with our understanding of cognitive biases. 
In the article “The Art of the Intelligence Autopsy,” Dr. Wirtz expands on work 
by Robert Jervis, who analyzed intelligence failures, including the U.S. invasion of Iraq 
in 2003, based on faulty intelligence estimates.81 Additionally, Dr. Wirtz discusses the 
correlations between cognitive bias and faulty intelligence analysis. He also states people 
interpret information through cognitive filters that process everything they are thinking 
and believe at the moment they receive new information.82 Moreover, he describes 
cognitive biases as consistent with the intelligence analysis process and IC politics that 
pose as significant challenges in identifying those errors.83 Finally, Dr. Wirtz agrees that 
changes to analytic tradecraft may be a more effective strategy than a reorganization of 
the IC as has occurred following past intelligence failures. 
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In his book Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons Learned from the Iranian Revolution 
and the Iraq War, Dr. Robert Jervis explores the causes of the intelligence failures 
regarding two specific issues: the assumption that Iran was secure and the belief that Iraq 
had a WMD program.84 Dr. Jervis is a recognized intelligence subject matter expert and 
is the Chair of the Historical Declassification Advisory Panel for the CIA. Additionally, 
Dr. Jervis prefers to use cognitive predispositions as opposed to cognitive biases. He also 
explains the human tendency to use beliefs as a filter all new information must pass 
through, despite the possibility that the information is not consistent with an assessment 
and therefore that evidence is altered or simply ignored.85  
Furthermore, Dr. Jervis references cognitive limitations and describes reliance on 
intuitive thinking as opposed to analytical thinking, resulting in an analyst expending less 
effort to make decisions.86 Among Dr. Jervis’s recommendations to improve the 
intelligence analysis process is the development and support of a peer review program, 
encouragement of alternative hypotheses, and improved training for analysts that is 
ongoing.87 Dr. Jervis notes that if the IC was aware of perceptual errors, processes would 
be improved to decrease those errors.88 These recommendations are consistent with the 
research in this thesis and are discussed in later chapters.  
Dr. Dahl is an intelligence expert, a professor at the Naval Postgraduate School, 
and a former intelligence officer for the Navy. In his book Intelligence and Surprise 
Attack, Dr. Erik Dahl provides an alternative view of why intelligence fails. He points out 
that most intelligence available prior to attacks is very general in nature and results in 
strategic warnings not specific enough to act on to prevent the attack.89 In addition, Dr. 
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Dahl proposes a theory of preventive action and two factors required to deliver an 
actionable intelligence product: the intelligence must be precise and the policy makers 
who must be receptive to that intelligence.90 Moreover, Dr. Dahl supports his theory with 
a comprehensive study of attacks from 1987–2012. He mentions hindsight bias several 
times when discussing why it is difficult today, when attempting to research intelligence 
failures of the past, to understand what the IC analysts were thinking at the time the event 
occurred. 
There are many intelligence analysis courses offered in the U.S. at many levels, 
including programs offering a certificate, bachelor degree, and a graduate degree. Policy 
research needs to include what the intelligence analysts are being taught in terms of the 
intelligence analysis process and to provide for a better understanding of the issues.  
Pennsylvania State University (Penn State) is one college offering an intelligence 
analysis course. According to the Penn State intelligence analysis course, titled 
Foundations of Geographic Information and Spatial Analysis, there are six basic 
intelligence sources to include human source, signals, imagery, measurement and 
signature, open source, and geospatial intelligence.91 Each of these intelligence sources 
has the potential to arrive at the analysis stage with biases already present. In addition, 
Penn State teaches future analysts the same intelligence cycle used by the majority of the 
IC today, including the tasking, collecting, processing, analyzing, and disseminating of 
intelligence. It also references the IC procedure of tasking, processing, exploitation, and 
dissemination (TPED) of that intelligence product to the consumers.92 TPED is referred 
to as bringing together the people, systems, and processes that add value to the 
intelligence collection system and the product resulting from the analysis. 
Furthermore, the Penn State analysis course references some of the reasons for 
intelligence failures and provides examples of those failures. The program materials 
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include information regarding the fact that cognitive bias in intelligence analysis can lead 
to intelligence failures.93 Some other reasons articulated for cognitive bias failures 
include intelligence analysts producing products in line with a supervisor’s hypothesis as 
opposed to the analyst’s hypothesis, basing opinions on prior knowledge, and mistakenly 
relying on the results of an analysis that occurred on prior occasions.94 These are 
cognitive bias limitations and consistent with the research on this topic. 
The Penn State program materials also state that the intelligence cycle currently 
utilized by the IC was not designed to deal with globalization, which presents a very 
different threat to our homeland security. The IC is now required to build analysis from 
intelligence around the world and, more specifically, on terrorist organizations and the 
countries in which they operate.95 From this research, it is clear that any change to the 
intelligence cycle model needs to be shared with the educational institutions teaching 
intelligence analysis. These institutions are tasked with providing future analysts with the 
tools and techniques to not only recognize and understand cognitive bias but also to 
recognize the effects on the intelligence process. 
Located at Mercyhurst University, the Tom Ridge School of Intelligence Studies 
and Information Science offers certificates and undergraduate and graduate degrees in 
intelligence analysis.96 These programs have over 400 students and offer the possibility 
of reaching future analysts to provide researchers and software developers the 
opportunity to test their ideas or products. It is an invaluable opportunity provided to the 
IC and is potentially a very important asset for future research. 
H. CONCLUSION  
This literature review has defined the intelligence cycle, the intelligence analysis 
process, and explored the training programs available to the IC. This chapter also 
                                                 
93 Ibid., 10. 
94 Ibid., 7. 
95 Ibid., 9. 
96 Mercyhurst University, Tom Ridge School of Intelligence Studies and Information Science, 
“Academic Programs,” accessed January 7, 2016, http://www.ridgecollege.org/academics.  
  30 
presented perspectives from the IC, the private sector, and academia. The next chapter of 
this thesis provides a history of cognitive psychology, explores cognitive bias from the 
psychological perspective, explains the relevance of cognitive bias awareness, provides 
for an understanding of how humans process information, and references a list of 
cognitive biases identified as relevant to intelligence analysis.  
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III. COGNITIVE BIAS 
It’s not what you look at that matters, it’s what you see. 
—Henry David Thoreau  
 
 
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
According to the Blackwell Handbook on Judgment and Decision Making, one of 
the first references to bias was in Shakespeare’s The Taming of the Shrew in the line, 
“Well, forward, forward the bowle should run. And not unluckily against the bias.” 
According to the authors, this reference is consistent with bias definitions used today to 
describe bias as deviations from the norm.97  
The history of cognitive biases begins with the study of cognitive psychology. 
George Miller is a Harvard University educated psychologist who also spent time at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Princeton University. His work titled, “The 
Magical Number Seven, Plus or Minus Two,” is one of the most quoted works in the field 
of cognitive psychology.98 In summary, Miller used information theory to provide 
support for evidence regarding the limitations of the human capacity for short-term 
memory storage. Miller hypothesized that humans had the ability to store between five 
and nine items in short-term memory, hence the number seven as the average. Miller 
suggests that humans could increase short-term memory storage by organizing and 
grouping the stimulus to allow for an increase in that storage ability.  
Miller states that in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the creation of the computer 
provided psychologists with the framework to begin to define how humans process 
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information.99 How computers process information served as a model allowing 
psychologists to understand how humans process information. Psychologists refer to this 
as the “computer analogy” and use it to describe how a human (computer) codes, stores, 
uses, and produces information.100 That analogy remains relevant and often quoted today 
in the psychological sciences literature. 
Miller’s work was followed up by Dr. Ulric Neisser, who is credited with the 
beginnings of cognitive psychology following his release of a book by the same name in 
1967.101 Dr. Neisser is considered the father of cognitive psychology, and he believed we 
could map our cognitive processes. His work led to defining cognitive psychology as the 
manner by which humans process information. Dr. Neisser postulated that memory is 
actually a reconstruction of the past, not a snapshot of an event, and the process of 
remembering is actually remembering our reconstructed memories.102 Dr. Neisser also 
said that once humans make an assumption, a bias becomes present and any research that 
follows will be tainted by that cognitive limitation.103  
Dr. Neisser studied memory and concluded that an emotional connection to an 
event resulted in a much clearer memory of that event when compared with a person who 
simply heard about it. He also concluded that emotional attachment has significant 
cognitive value.104 This hypothesis is consistent with a bias in that when making 
decisions during the analysis process, intelligence analysts will place more value on an 
event that has occurred as opposed to the many events that did not occur. Dr. Neisser 
agreed with other researchers that memories were important and had the ability to present 
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a cognitive limitation. He disagreed in that those memories were not without errors and 
should be verified before consideration during analysis. This is a pertinent point and 
consistent with this research in proposing an external analysis of intelligence products 
prior to dissemination. 
In the late 1960s, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky met while teaching 
graduate courses and immediately became friends and co-researchers. In a biographical 
article, Kahneman talks about the two of them writing on the availability heuristic, the 
psychology of prediction, and the study of biases.105 Their first published article in 1974 
identified cognitive biases, and they are credited with that term. The article postulated 
that judgment regarding uncertain events could sometimes result in predictable biases. 
Kahneman and Tversky identified with system 1 and system 2 thinking. The work by 
these two influential psychologists continued into the 1990s with additional research into 
cognitive processes and associated limitations.  
B. PSYCHOLOGICAL DEFINITION 
A seminal study by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, titled Judgement under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, is often quoted in almost any credible research into 
cognitive biases. The term cognitive bias was first introduced by Amos Tversky and 
Daniel Kahneman in the 1970s and was used to describe a person’s systematic but flawed 
patterns of response to both judgment and decision problems.106 This work remains very 
influential regarding impacts and limitations in human reasoning/decision making and 
resulted in Kahneman being awarded the Nobel Prize in 2002. The authors posit that 
heuristics and biases impede our ability to determine the probability of an action 
occurring for an uncertain event.107 Tversky and Kahneman focused on 
representativeness and how people apply this cognitive bias when making judgments 
                                                 
105 Daniel Kahneman and Vernon L. Smith, “Daniel Kahneman-Biographical,” Nobelprize.org, 
accessed March 10, 2016, http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-
sciences/laureates/2002/kahneman-bio.html.  
106 Tversky and Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty.  
107 Ibid. 
  34 
about the probability of an event under uncertainty.108 This research on heuristics and 
biases appears throughout the literature, and the work appears to be just as significant 
today as it was in 1974. 
Two of the cognitive biases relevant to the IC are confirmation bias and anchoring 
bias. Confirmation bias can be defined as a propensity to interpret intelligence in a way 
that confirms preconceptions.109 This type of bias is most often referred to throughout 
this literature review. Confirmation bias is a potential fatal error analysts commit in 
seeking out intelligence information that simply confirms what they believe to be true, 
while ignoring other relevant information that may be to the contrary.  
Anchoring bias describes the tendency in analyzing intelligence to rely almost 
exclusively on the first piece of information offered.110 This type of bias is also referred 
to throughout this literature review. Anchoring bias can be a fatal error in that the 
intelligence analyst will rely on primary information and fail to perform additional 
analysis that could lead to an alternative hypothesis. Anchoring bias is cognitively easier 
on the analyst, and it requires much less cognitive effort. This is consistent with intuitive 
reasoning. 
C. RELEVANCE OF COGNITIVE BIAS AWARENESS 
There is very little literature regarding the influence of cognitive bias on the 
intelligence process. This could simply be attributed to the fact that on the whole, 
national intelligence is classified and not open to public scrutiny or review. According to 
Richards Heuer in his influential book Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, one of the 
limitations on intelligence analysis is cognitive bias.111 Heuer is a recognized intelligence 
expert with a 45-year career working for the CIA, and his work is cited in almost any 
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research into intelligence analysis. Heuer defines cognitive bias as a limitation on human 
thinking that occurs when people process and interpret information.112 A limitation on 
human thinking is relevant when understanding that intelligence analysis is a human task 
process.  
In the Journal of Management Studies article “Cognitive Biases and Strategic 
Decision Process: An Integrative Perspective,” the authors follow up on the research by 
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman. They assert that intelligence analysts make 
decisions following an analysis and may not understand the relevance of how cognitive 
bias can influence those decisions. The article discusses the fact that often decision 
makers rely on intuitive reasoning in order to simplify a cognitively challenging decision, 
and the potential consequences of relying on that simple and fast cognitive process.113 
In addition, authors Tversky and Kahneman state that cognitive biases can be 
viewed as one of the negative consequences of employing the intuitive reasoning process 
when the proper cognitive process should be the use of analytical reasoning.114 
Intelligence analysis is cognitively challenging, and their journal article stresses the 
importance of maximizing potential for success when making strategic decisions through 
the use of proper analytical reasoning. Furthermore. the authors propose an integrated 
framework that forces managers to be aware of their assumptions, heuristics, and 
cognitive biases in decision making.115  
There is a large body of research exploring the influences of cognitive bias in 
many different disciplines, and much of that research involves the effects of cognitive 
bias when making a clinical diagnosis. For example, an article in the New England 
Journal of Medicine presents research into cognitive bias and decision making in the 
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medical field.116 The author, Pat Croskerry, explains the two processes used by human 
beings when making a decision—intuitive and analytical reasoning. Intuitive reasoning is 
described as reflexive based on our experiences and occurs in a fraction of second.117 
This type of cognitive thinking is completed subconsciously thousands of times every day 
and requires little if any thought processes. Croskerry argues that most cognitive errors 
occur during the intuitive process.118  
Analytic reasoning is described as a conscious, deliberate cognitive effort that is 
mostly reliable and based on science, logic, and rational thinking.119 The author suggests 
that recognizing cognitive biases is difficult, and de-biasing techniques will more than 
likely require lifelong maintenance once an effective strategy is identified.120 Lifelong 
maintenance is a very important consideration in any meaningful discussion of cognitive 
bias mitigation strategies, and that view is shared by other subject matter experts in this 
literature review. The cognitive limitations require regular education, training, and 
awareness to decrease the possibility of allowing those biases to influence intelligence 
analysis. 
In general, research indicates intelligence analysts have specific educational 
requirements and receive specific training. However, there does not appear to be 
consistent standards across the IC on what exactly that education and training should 
include. Would that fact of lack of consistency reduce or enhance susceptibility to the 
effects of cognitive bias? Interestingly, a separate study that complements the work of 
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Tversky and Kahneman postulates that cognitive intelligence does not reduce the effect 
of the biases identified during information processing or decision making.121  
In the journal article “Cognitive Sophistication Does Not Attenuate the Bias Blind 
Spot,” the researchers determined that those with high levels of cognitive sophistication 
were just as susceptible to bias blind spots as persons who are less cognitively 
sophisticated.122 Perhaps more interesting is the premise that an intelligent person is able 
to identify the biases of another person but unable to recognize her or his own biases.123 
This is an important consideration when attempting to develop successful cognitive bias 
mitigation strategies. This research suggests that simply relying solely on personal 
reporting would thus yield inaccurate results. 
D. SYSTEM 1 AND SYSTEM 2 THINKING 
Understanding how humans process information is an important part of this 
research and relevant when identifying mitigation strategies. Humans make many 
decisions throughout the day that have no significant consequences if incorrect. Many of 
those decisions require no deep thought or critical thinking and safely rely on past 
experiences. These types of decisions are defined as the availability heuristic.124 The 
availability heuristic is the cognitive process of problem solving based on learning and 
experience. This intuitive thinking process requires little cognitive effort and can lead to 
errors during the analysis process. Examples include the simplified rules humans live by 
that provide for effortless, quick decisions throughout the day. These types of decisions 
feel instinctive and effortless.  
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In contrast to intuitive reasoning is analytical reasoning, which can be defined as 
the deliberate cognitive effort required during complex analysis.125 Analytical reasoning 
requires cognitive effort and the employment of critical thinking skills. This is the 
process people use when attempting to think through a problem where prior knowledge 
and experience may not be enough. Analytical reasoning is difficult and a necessity when 
people are forced to make decisions that have significant consequences. This is the 
preferred mental process that should be employed by intelligence analysts at each step of 
the intelligence cycle. There is great risk in using the intuitive reasoning process during 
the intelligence analysis process. This chapter explores the two types of cognitive 
reasoning processes to provide for a better understanding of the human cognitive 
experience. 
An article in the Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, titled “Cognitive 
Predispositions and Intelligence Analyst Reasoning,” studies the issue of analyst 
reasoning and thinking. Two types of cognitive processes identified and defined in the 
article are natural and systematic reasoning. Natural reasoning is defined as fast, 
effortless, and requiring little cognitive effort, and it is useful in everyday decision 
making, social groups, and serves to store memories connected with emotions.126 These 
types of decisions just feel right and are valid for familiar situations but not effective for 
situations involving uncertainty. Natural reasoning depends on familiarity with the 
situation. It is a cognitive response that cannot be “turned off” because it is the human 
automatic response.127 
In contrast to natural reasoning is systematic reasoning, and this cognitive effort is 
slow, methodical, and requires a process that can be described.128 The systematic 
reasoning process is normally associated with probabilities, logic, signals, methods, and 
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processes.129 Cognitive reasoning is a slippery slope due to the human inclination to 
resort to natural reasoning because of the minimal cognitive effort it requires. Sometimes 
humans do it without the realization it has occurred, and sometimes at the expense of 
systematic reasoning. This article provides recommendations to reduce cognitive 
predispositions on analytic products, including analyst training utilizing veteran 
intelligence analysts who have prior positive and negative experiences to share, de-
biasing and predisposition awareness training, IC acceptance of new practices and 
tradecraft, and continued regular training and development to reinforce the systematic 
reasoning process.130  
Limitations of the human mind include cognitive biases in perception and 
judgment.131 Human beings interpret information through “filters” and evaluate that 
information against past experiences. Who we are is a powerful influence when 
evaluating the world or, more specifically, when attempting to analyze information. 
Humans do not have the ability to turn off those filters but can certainly be trained to 
recognize their presence and work within a framework that forces an accounting for their 
limitations. Biases in human perception and judgment will always be present and forcing 
an intelligence analyst to consider alternatives would appear to be an important 
mitigation strategy.132 Perception and judgment are different for everyone and being 
forced to account for that bias would lead to a better intelligence product.133  
The business perspective on cognitive reasoning appears to be consistent with the 
IC perspective. In the article “The Big Idea before You Make That Big Decision” from 
the Harvard Business Review, the authors provide a background of the potential 
distortions in business decisions resulting from cognitive biases. The authors describe 
                                                 
129 Ibid.  
130 Ibid., 456–458. 
131 Heuer, Psychology of Intelligence Analysis, 111.  
132 Central Intelligence Agency, A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques for Improving 
Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2009), 
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-
monographs/Tradecraft%20Primer-apr09.pdf, 1.  
133 Ibid., 5. 
  40 
two modes of thinking, intuitive and reflective. Intuitive thinking is considered System 1 
and produces a constant representation of our daily environment.134 There is no need to 
focus on this type of thinking as it is done throughout the day, such as going to bed when 
tired and drinking water when thirsty.  
Reflective thinking is considered system 2, and not only is it slow, methodical, 
requires effort, it is governed by rules.135 System 2 thinking is activated when errors are 
detected or reasoning is required. Additionally, system 2 thinking is necessary during the 
intelligence analysis process when patterns are identified and need to be connected in 
order to indicate a concern. All of these definitions are consistent with other research in 
this literature review and previously identified as intuitive and analytical reasoning.136 
Cognitive biases are intuitive (system 1) errors, and humans are not aware when 
the result is limited thinking.137 Decision makers have the opportunity to identify analyst 
biases by utilizing reflective (system 2) or analytical thinking. The Harvard Business 
Review article suggests most executives employ system 2 thinking to identify system 1 
limitations and errors.138 In addition, the authors developed a 12-question checklist 
designed to identify cognitive biases present in the recommendations executives receive. 
The questions force executives to consider motivations, bias, dissenting opinions, 
credibility, questions, alternatives, and sources of information.139 Moreover, the authors 
assert these questions will assist in the identification of limitations resulting from 
cognitive biases of the teams providing the recommendations. The questions easily 
correlate to questions the IC could be asking when reviewing an intelligence product and 
should be considered during any intelligence analysis process. 
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In summary, this research has identified two modes of thinking. The first has been 
identified as intuitive, natural, or system 1 thinking. This is instinctive and occurs many 
times throughout the day and requires little cognitive effort. The second mode of thinking 
has been identified as analytical, systematic, reflective, or system 2 thinking. This is 
methodical and requires significant cognitive effort. Cognitive biases are thought to occur 
much more frequently as a result of system 1 thinking. Intelligence analysis would 
benefit from the use of system 2 thinking to decrease the potential for cognitive 
limitations.  
E. RELEVANT COGNITIVE BIASES  
The European Union funded a study called the Reduction of Cognitive Biases in 
Intelligence Analysis (RECOBIA). The goal of the study was to identify and reduce the 
negative effects of cognitive biases upon the intelligence analysis process. The study 
included a series of workshops involving intelligence organizations and analysts with 
project completion in early 2015. Unfortunately, the findings and recommendations are 
restricted and will not be made available to the public. This researcher was able to make 
contact with one of the project managers who agreed to provide very limited information 
that could be used for this thesis. That information provided by the RECOBIA project 
included a list of 47 cognitive biases identified as relevant to the IC (see Appendix A for 
the list and definitions).140  
Some of the more recent sources of information reviewed for this thesis referred 
to the list of cognitive biases found on the Wikipedia website. That list contains 172 
cognitive biases categorized by decision-making biases, belief biases, behavioral biases, 
social biases, and memory error biases. Any number of these biases could easily apply to 
the IC and the intelligence analysis process. This second list of cognitive biases is 
provided in Appendix B.141 Although there are many more identified cognitive biases, 
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for the purposes of scoping, this thesis is focused on the two biases cited most frequently 
in the literature review; confirmation bias, and anchoring bias.  
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IV. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
’Tis but a part we see, and not a whole. 
—Alexander Pope  
 
 
A. INTELLIGENCE CYCLE AS A SYSTEM 
The intelligence analyst is asked to critically evaluate often ambiguous 
information derived from many different sources using the intelligence cycle as the 
structure for that analysis process. The intelligence cycle is an open structured system, 
and every step of that system is influenced by the preceding and the proceeding step. The 
purpose of this structured system is to carry out a specific activity (intelligence analysis) 
to accomplish an objective (e.g., produce a relevant intelligence product).142 Each of the 
elements (steps) of this system are interrelated and influence each other, and the system 
allows for inputs and outputs while the structure remains in place, despite the dynamics 
of the external environment.143 The inputs, outputs, and feedback are all critical elements 
of the intelligence cycle and support the structure of the system.  
The inputs and outputs are driven by the intelligence analysts. The intelligence 
cycle requires both inputs and outputs, and both have the ability to influence each step in 
the intelligence cycle. If the inputs have a bias present, there is a strong possibility the 
outputs will also. Depending on whether or not the analyst is aware of the presence of 
that bias, the output will be influenced. Humans provide a great deal of the relevant 
information used by the IC, and in turn this provides many opportunities for the 
influences of cognitive bias to affect each step of the intelligence cycle. Feedback is also 
a part of this system and can be an opportunity to detect the presence of a cognitive bias.  
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Feedback is an important part of any system. At each step of the cycle, the 
intelligence analyst critically analyzes information, makes adjustments, and requests 
additional information depending on what was learned. In the dynamic environment of 
intelligence analysis, feedback is critical to the process as it presents the analyst with 
opportunities to corroborate the information received. The process of corroboration 
presents the analyst with the opportunity to mitigate any bias that may be present but 
remains susceptible to human factors, and those influences can lead to cognitive bias 
creep.   
B. COGNITIVE BIAS CREEP 
The intelligence cycle does not account for the human factor, and therefore is 
susceptible to cognitive bias creep. Human factors include the social, psychological, 
political, cultural, organizational, behavioral, and educational attributes influencing the 
decision-making process. Humans will always make errors and to think any differently 
would be unreasonable. However, knowing those human errors will occur presents the IC 
with opportunities to build a more resilient system through the intelligence cycle.  
At every step of the intelligence cycle, there are opportunities for cognitive bias to 
creep into the process. As an example, the steps of the intelligence cycle do not force the 
analyst to externalize assumptions, critically evaluate information received, or consider 
alternative hypotheses. Each of these strategies could potentially alert the analyst to 
cognitive bias creep and counter the influence of those cognitive limitations on the 
analysis process.  
Working through the intelligence cycle requires significant cognitive effort, and 
as such there may be temptation to resort to intuitive reasoning. This research strongly 
suggests that intelligence analysis should solely employ the use of analytical reasoning. 
The intuitive process is easy and fast but highly susceptible to errors. As soon as the 
critical thinking ceases, even for just a moment or two and a decision is made, cognitive 
bias is provided opportunities to creep into the process. Once that limitation occurs, all 
analysis after that time is now tainted and could potentially result in faulty analysis. That 
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moment could occur at any of the steps of the intelligence cycle from the requirements to 
planning, collection, processing, analysis, or dissemination. 
Intelligence analysts need to be acutely aware of the inherent dangers of intuitive 
reasoning and the relevance of analytical reasoning. This is justification for the IC to 
employ mitigation strategies. One such strategy is the use of a more structured analytic 
technique requiring the analyst to list all assumptions. This improved analytic structure 
could provide an independent reviewer with an opportunity to question those assumptions 
and possibly identify the presence of cognitive biases. There are mitigation strategies 
available to the IC now with emerging strategies in development. Those strategies are 
presented in the following sections.  
C. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATES  
The National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) represents the formal, written strategic 
intelligence product completed by the IC with a focus on foreign developments of interest 
and possible impact to the United States.144 The concept for the NIE has its origins in the 
passage of the National Security Act of 1947, and today many of the agencies of the IC 
are responsible for assisting with the required production and analysis.145 For instance, 
the National Intelligence Council (NIC) is responsible for coordinating NIE efforts and 
reports to the DNI.146 NIEs are judgments from subject matter experts (SME) from inside 
and occasionally outside the IC regarding a specific issue of concern to the United States. 
NIEs are not expected to be accurate predictions of what will occur; they are merely 
estimates of what might occur. Therefore, they are assigned confidence values to assist 
the decision makers.  
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The creation of an NIE involves a formal process with many stakeholders 
involved. According to the Council on Foreign Relations that process consists of the 
following steps:147 
1. NIEs can be requested by senior members of the executive branch of 
government, House or Senate committee chairs, senior officials of the 
military branches, or the NIC. The DNI authorizes all requests for NIEs.  
2. Terms of reference (TOR) are produced to define the specific information 
being requested, who is ultimately responsible for drafting the document, 
and provides a time schedule. The TOR is then circulated through the IC 
to provide opportunities for comment. The draft of the NIE is reviewed by 
the NIC prior to distribution to the specific agencies of the IC.  
3. Experts from different IC agencies then review the draft and are provided 
opportunities for analysis and comment.  
4. Agency representatives will then participate in a meeting to discuss the 
draft NIE and any potential changes.  
5. The National Clandestine Service (NCS) of the CIA then review the draft 
NIE in order to assist with vetting the intelligence to provide comment on 
the reliability of sources and information.  
6. The final draft of the NIE is submitted to IC agency experts for review and 
can include analysis from SMEs employed outside of the U.S. 
government.  
7. The NIC is provided with the final draft of the NIE and forwards it to 
representatives of the IC and the DNI, who together comprise the National 
Intelligence Board.  
8. The NIE is then approved by the National Intelligence Board and 
delivered to the person who made the request. Additionally, copies of the 
NIE are provided to the president, senior government officials, and 
specific members of Congress. 
NIEs are susceptible to the effects of cognitive bias at each step of production. 
The analysts and decision makers with any responsibility for the NIE possess cognitive 
biases that can influence the process or present limitations. Because creation of the NIE 
involves human task performance, the NIEs are also susceptible to additional biases 
related to the public discourse at that moment in time, including the politics of the day 
and the risk that the NIE may be counter to current U.S. strategy or policy. Time is also a 
                                                 
147 Ibid. 
  47 
relevant factor that could influence intelligence analyst assessments. In a perfect world, 
the analysts would be provided with opportunities to evaluate any intelligence included in 
the NIE; however, in the reality of the war on terrorism, there will be dynamic events that 
will not allow such an opportunity.  
Following the NIE released in 2002 regarding Iraq’s continuing programs for 
weapons of mass destruction and the faulty intelligence attributed to that document, the 
DNI implemented changes to the NIE process as recommended in 2005 by the 
Silberman-Robb Commission to improve intelligence analysis.148 Among the 
recommendations was compelling intelligence analysts to conduct a more thorough 
analysis, question any assumptions and judgments, be cognizant of groupthink, and 
provide for the inclusion of alternative analysis.149 Although the DNI has implemented 
some of these recommendations, the IC continues to experience the negative effects of 
cognitive bias, as evidenced by the intelligence failures at Benghazi in 2012—explored in 
the following section.   
D. CASE STUDY: BENGHAZI 
On September 11, 2012, the nation was again remembering the terrorist events of 
9/11. Terrorism has remained a critical concern to the IC and rightfully so. Between 1998 
and 2012, there were 273 significant terrorist attacks against U.S. facilities and 
personnel.150 Terrorist attacks were increasing around the world and the U.S. assets 
abroad were often the target of those attacks. Libya was no exception. Beginning in June 
of 2012, there were 12 separate attacks in or near Benghazi against U.S. assets, including 
                                                 
148 Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States, Commission on the Intelligence 
Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction (Washington, DC: Commission 
on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States, 2005), https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/wmd_report.pdf.  
149 Harvard University, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, “National Intelligence 
Estimates,” accessed April 15, 2016, 
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19150/national_intelligence_estimates.html. 
150 Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, Significant Attacks Against U.S. Diplomatic 
Facilities and Personnel, 1998–2012 (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2014), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/225846.pdf.  
  48 
20 security incidents at the U.S. facility in Benghazi.151 There were increasing signs that 
our assets in Benghazi were very much at risk for a significant terrorist attack, and those 
on the ground were asking for additional security measures.152 
According to a report by the U.S. Senate Committee, the following is a timeline 
of the terrorist attacks against two U.S. facilities in Benghazi in 2012153  
The US was occupying a Department of State (DS) Temporary Mission 
Facility (TMF) and approximately one mile away an Annex facility used 
by a different US government agency in Benghazi, Libya. The TMF was 
occupied by Ambassador Christopher Stevens, State Department Officer 
Sean Smith, two American security officers, and a small, contingent of US 
and Libyan personnel.  
At approximately 9:40 pm, the personnel inside the TMF began hearing 
shouting, gunshots, and an explosion outside. Security monitors showed a 
large number of armed terrorists entering the main gate unchallenged. The 
alarm was sounded and the US Embassy in Tripoli and the DS 
headquarters in Washington DC were immediately notified of the 
situation. The DS notified the DoD and the on-site DS officer notified the 
Annex and requested security personnel respond to assist. 
Ambassador Stevens, Officer Smith, and one of the DS officers sought 
refuge in the building’s fortified area while three other agents went to 
retrieve weapons. Two of the three agents attempted to reach Ambassador 
Stevens and encountered armed terrorists. The terrorists attempted to 
breach the area where Ambassador Stevens was hiding and were unable to 
do so. They then began setting fire to the buildings resulting in thick 
smoke inside the TMF. Ambassador Stevens, Officer Smith, and the agent 
became separated as they attempted to escape from the smoke-filled 
building. 
At 10:30 pm the Annex security personnel reached the TMF and began 
exchanging gunfire with the terrorists. At 11:15 pm an unmanned, 
unarmed surveillance aircraft began circling overhead providing images of 
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what was occurring. At about midnight the terrorists began firing rocket 
propelled grenades (RPG) at the Annex. 
US government security personnel based in Tripoli arrived at Benghazi 
Airport at 1:15 on September 12. They were forced to negotiate with the 
Libyan government for approximately three hours before being allowed to 
respond for assistance. The security team arrived at the Annex at 5:04 am 
just as the terrorists began firing mortar rounds at the facility.  
Former Navy SEALs Tyrone Woods and Glen Doherty were both killed at 
that time. Before the terrorist attack ended Ambassador Stevens, Officer 
Sean Smith, and two US security officers were killed at the TMF.  
This U.S. Senate Committee report provided findings and recommendations 
following the attacks at Benghazi. One of the findings was the IC failed to focus attention 
on other violent Islamist extremist groups not affiliated with al-Qaeda, despite the 
presence of open source intelligence indicating these groups were opportunistic and 
capable of attacking U.S. facilities in Benghazi.154 One of the recommendations was that 
the IC should expand focus in Libya to include violent Islamist extremist groups not 
affiliated with al-Qaeda to improve tactical warning capabilities.155 This finding and 
recommendation is consistent with confirmation bias in that the IC only focused on 
intelligence related to al-Qaeda, despite the presence of conflicting intelligence regarding 
threats from other extremist groups. 
On September 16, 2012, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan Rice 
reported to the media that the attacks in Benghazi were the result of a small contingent of 
protestors attempting to replicate events occurring at the same time in Cairo where 
protestors had breached the U.S. embassy walls and destroyed an American flag.156 
Ambassador Rice stated the protests were the result of outrage over an anti-Muslim 
video. Many other U.S. government officials echoed the statements made by Ambassador 
Rice. Those statements contradicted Libyan President Mohamed Yousef El-Magariaf 
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when he stated the attacks were preplanned by persons who came into Libya a few 
months earlier.157 There was no mention of protests prior to the attacks on the U.S. 
facilities by the Libyan government. 
One of the findings by the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the 
report on the Benghazi attacks was that the IC inaccurately referred to the presence of a 
protest at the TMF in Benghazi prior to the attacks.158 The committee found that the IC 
relied on various reports when releasing the inaccurate intelligence products referring to 
protests prior to the attacks, including six media reports, two statements from Ansar al-
Sharia (a terrorist organization),159 and three intelligence reports.160  
In addition, the committee found that the IC also had intelligence reports 
indicating there were no protests prior to the attacks, but it failed to include that 
information in the intelligence products released.161 The IC’s release of the inaccurate 
intelligence products surveillance videos from outside the TMF showed there were no 
protests prior to the attacks. According to the committee, the IC then changed the 
assessments, indicating that in fact there were no protests at the TMF prior to the attacks. 
The delay in revising the assessments resulted in many U.S. government officials falsely 
reporting the presence of protests to the media.162 The IC failed to corroborate the open 
source press reports, thus basing faulty intelligence on the first piece of information 
received. This is indicative of anchoring bias in that the IC relied on the initial 
intelligence received and failed to attempt to corroborate that information even though 
there was conflicting intelligence present.  
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In summary, the IC failed to focus attention on other violent Islamist extremist 
groups despite the presence of open source intelligence indicating these groups were 
opportunistic and capable of attacking U.S. facilities in Benghazi. This is consistent with 
confirmation bias in that the IC was directing intelligence gathering efforts at al-Qaeda 
and affiliated groups, mistakenly believing they would be the only terrorists capable of 
attacking the U.S. in Libya. The IC was attempting to solely confirm intelligence that 
pointed to al-Qaeda. This cognitive bias influenced the collection, processing, analysis, 
and dissemination steps of the intelligence cycle. 
Furthermore, the IC relied upon uncorroborated reports of protests prior to the 
attacks and failed to mention any of the information received indicating there were no 
protests. The IC then changed the assessments, but the damage was already done. The 
inaccurate intelligence products disseminated to the government resulted in inaccurate 
information delivered to the media following these attacks. The IC relied on the first 
intelligence reports received and failed to corroborate that intelligence, which is 
indicative of anchoring bias. This cognitive bias influenced the collection, processing, 
analysis, and dissemination steps of the intelligence cycle. 
One of the additional committee findings was that the IC failed to place adequate 
emphasis on the exploitation of open source information and extremist social media.163 
That lack of emphasis can be interpreted as a cognitive bias in that the IC believed the 
current intelligence collection strategies were adequate. Furthermore, the IC did not feel 
it necessary to explore available open sources of information and social media despite the 
widespread use of both by many violent extremist organizations. This cognitive limitation 
influenced the collection step of the intelligence cycle, and as a result it influenced the 
ability to process, analyze, and disseminate accurate intelligence products. 
D. ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 
The Israeli Intelligence Community (IIC) is divided into three main agencies: the 
Directorate of Military Intelligence (AMAN), the Israeli Security Agency (SHABAK), 
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and Mossad. AMAN is one of the branches inside the Israel Defense Force. AMAN 
provides intelligence required at the strategic and operational decision making at the 
national level, studies political trends, economic activity, technological innovations, and 
military affairs throughout the world, and it is responsible for the electronic and 
collection units of the IIC.164  
The IIC has suffered major intelligence failures leading to positive changes as 
evidenced by the Yom Kippur War. The following history regarding the IIC comes from 
the Brookings Institution and the white paper titled Lessons from Israel’s Intelligence 
Reforms.165  
The Arab-Israeli conflict was ongoing in 1948 when the State of Israel was 
formed. Following the Six-Day War of 1967, Israel captured the Sinai Peninsula from 
Egypt, half of the Golan Heights from Syria, and the West Bank from Jordan. The Israeli 
Defense Forces (IDF) and, in particular AMAN, were responsible for intelligence 
assessments at that time. 
Prior to October 6, 1973, AMAN dismissed warnings of a pending war against 
Israel despite having significant knowledge of Arab war plans. The Egyptian Army was 
conducting military exercises near the Israeli border, and the Israeli military had 
responded with military exercises at a significant cost in terms of resources and money. 
When no attack occurred, AMAN attributed the moves by Egypt as simply military 
exercises. In the week leading up to Yom Kippur, large-scale troop movement by Egypt 
continued, and again the intelligence was dismissed as military exercises; AMAN also 
dismissed Syrian troop movements occurring at the same time. At the start of Yom 
Kippur, Egypt and Syria attacked Israel, and the IIC had not provided the intelligence 
required to prepare for the invasion. This event is recognized as a significant failure on 
the part of the IIC. 
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Following the Yom Kippur War intelligence failures, the Israeli government 
established the Agranat Commission in November 1973 to investigate the performance of 
the Israeli intelligence and security services. The Agranat Commission released the 
Inquiry Interim Report in 1974, and it provided a summary of the initial findings and 
recommendations.166 The report concluded the director of military intelligence had 
adopted the groupthink that was present in the IIC and therefore was not open to new 
intelligence information that might contradict known information.167 Groupthink is 
identified as a cognitive bias and is limitation to the intelligence analysis process. The 
Agranat Commission also recommended the creation of a control unit that was expected 
to challenge provide alternative assessments and challenge assumptions.168 
The Israeli intelligence reforms began following the Yom Kippur War but 
continued through 1998.169 Unlike the U.S., Israel did not wait until a catastrophic event 
to implement intelligence reforms. The changes in the characteristics of war, changes in 
the military doctrine of Israeli’s enemies, and the impact of the information age were all 
catalysts for changes to the IIC.170 The IIC appears to have recognized early on that the 
fight against terrorism would require a significant change in intelligence strategy.  
AMAN values openness, and the intelligence analysts are expected to express 
dissenting opinions as evidenced by its slogan “freedom of opinion, discipline in 
action.”171 Encouraging dissenting opinions appears to be unique to the IIC, and this 
researcher was unable to locate any similar strategies employed by the IC. AMAN has a 
“devil’s advocate office” to ensure creativity and assist with avoiding cognitive bias and 
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groupthink.172 The use of a devil’s advocate approach is a strategy whereby a group or 
individual provides for ideas and questions that run counter to the consensus.173  
This strategy provides opportunities for balance and a more objective view of the 
analysis. The IIC employs the devil’s advocate approach during the intelligence analysis 
process to remain relevant and effective. The intelligence analysts are encouraged and 
allowed to participate in the intelligence analysis process as well as provided 
opportunities to ask questions and challenge assumptions to identify any cognitive biases 
or groupthink that may be present.  
Some of AMAN’s responsibilities are to critically evaluate intelligence 
assessments, author written opinions counter to those assessments, explore alternative 
assessments, and present alternative assumptions.174 Intelligence analysts are provided 
the freedom and ability to express alternative opinions and encouraged to author 
“different opinion” memos, allowing them to safely critique conclusions from their 
department.175 This strategy appears to be very similar to loyal opposition. Loyal 
opposition allows for the same goal (providing intelligence to safeguard a nation) while 
perhaps disagreeing on the majority opinion. Loyal opposition provides an acceptable 
platform to allow an intelligence analyst to combat cognitive bias and groupthink.176  
The IIC strategy of permitting and encouraging cognitive freedom provides 
opportunities to identify and combat cognitive biases and groupthink that may be present 
in the intelligence assessments. This strategy also provides opportunities to mitigate those 
negative effects. In addition to this strategy, AMAN appears to maintain close 
relationships with both decision makers and collectors. These relationships appear to 
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strengthen the effectiveness and resiliency of the IIC. The IIC strategy and others present 
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V. COGNITIVE BIAS MITIGATION STRATEGIES 





This research has identified potential strategies to successfully mitigate the effects 
of cognitive bias during the intelligence analysis process and, more specifically, the 
effects on the intelligence cycle. Academia and the social sciences are still attempting to 
understand how to mitigate the effects of cognitive biases and how human cognitive 
performance can be optimized; there are promising possibilities.177 This research has 
identified strategies the IC could employ now to mitigate the effects of cognitive bias on 
the intelligence cycle. Those strategies include perspectives on this problem from the IC, 
the private sector, and academia.  
This research has also identified emerging strategies that will be available in the 
future, including the use of technology. Although this technology remains in the 
development and testing stages, it holds great promise for the future of intelligence 
analysis. Developments in artificial intelligence technologies are increasing, and the 
prospects of incorporating that type of technology for use in the intelligence field is 
significant.  
IBM’s Watson is an example of an emerging cognitive technology that has the 
ability to analyze enormous amounts of unstructured data, learn from that data, and 
presents answers and solutions.178 Watson is already being employed in the fields of 
business, healthcare, developers, and universities. However, this is still the very 
beginning stages of cognitive technologies. With the substantial investments in these 
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types of technologies, there will undoubtedly be rapid growth in this field that will 
present opportunities to the IC. 
Potential mitigation strategies to decrease cognitive limitations will be grouped in 
the following chapter as psychological strategies, analytical strategies and technological 
strategies. These groupings will serve to organize the various strategies and provide 
context for the possible solutions.  
B. PSYCHOLOGICAL STRATEGIES 
A report by the CIA’s Directorate of Intelligence at Kent School’s Global Futures 
Partnership and the RAND Corporation looked at how the IC could make sense of 
transnational threats.179 The researchers for the project also held a series of workshops. 
These workshops were attended by IC analysts and experts from the private sector 
representing fields, such as cognitive psychology, organizational culture, and terrorism. 
One of the primary findings of the workshops was the need for IC analysts to employ 
critical thinking skills or “mindfulness” during the analysis process. Mindfulness was 
described in the report as being preoccupied with past and future failures and associated 
with a learning environment in which there was value in admitting mistakes, raising 
doubts, and asking questions.180  
Critical thinking must occur regularly and cannot be specific to certain aspects of 
the intelligence analysis process. The report documents the need for mindfulness to be 
continual, creative, collaborative, counter-intuitive, and consumer friendly.181 In 
addition, the report describes continual as consistently exploring alternative outcomes 
and assumptions, creative as encouraging diversity on the team, allowing for the freedom 
to discuss the intelligence out loud with others, collaborative as working as a team, 
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counterintuitive as seeking evidence contrary to assumptions, and consumer friendly as 
allowing for changes in variables to produce different outcomes.182  
Critical thinking is employing the analytical reasoning process (system 2) and 
results in questioning assumptions and identifying areas of analysis susceptible to errors. 
Based on the research presented in this thesis, this mitigation strategy appears to be 
crucial to effective intelligence analysis and the cornerstone in attempts to limit the 
influence of cognitive bias. Analytical reasoning requires cognitive effort and the 
employment of critical thinking skills. This is the preferred mental process that should be 
employed by intelligence analysts at each step of the intelligence cycle.  
C. ANALYTICAL STRATEGIES 
There are other strategies available to the IC in addition to the psychological 
strategies. Analytical strategies are just as important to the tradecraft of intelligence 
analysis and some of those strategies will be explored in this section. 
1. Alternative Analysis 
Alternative analysis is the process of empowering intelligence analysts and 
decision makers to question analytical estimates, perform cognitively rigorous review, 
and explore alternative outcomes.183 Alternative analysis takes advantage of the power of 
diversity and/or groups as opposed to individual analysts working through the 
intelligence cycle. Some of the sources identified during this literature review promote 
the value of providing opportunities for an independent review of the intelligence cycle 
steps and associated assumptions. A few of the alternative analysis strategies worth 
exploring are red teaming, devil’s advocate, and the peer review process. 
According to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the Joint Publication 2-0, red teams are 
“organizational elements comprised of trained, educated, and practiced experts that 
provide [an] independent capability to conduct critical reviews and analysis [from] an 
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alternative perspective.”184 This appears to be an important strategy that could assist with 
identifying any cognitive bias present in an intelligence product and is consistent with 
other research in this literature review. The use of a red team has been identified for 
many years as a potential strategy for success already utilized by the DOD.185  
This report highlights the advantage of utilizing red teams to combat pre-existing 
assumptions and biases.186 Red teams have the ability to view the analysis from an 
independent perspective and could provide alternative hypotheses worthy of 
consideration by the decision makers. Moreover, the red team brings added value to the 
intelligence product by assuring that the information has been vetted through a collection 
of experts who bring diverse backgrounds to that intelligence product.187 
The use of a devil’s advocate approach is a strategy whereby an individual or 
group provides for ideas and questions that run counter to the consensus.188 This strategy 
provides balance and an objective view of the issues. There are many examples of 
groupthink remaining unchallenged, and the result can be catastrophic. One such example 
was the loss of the Challenger spacecraft and the subsequent identification of groupthink 
as a major contributing factor to that failure.189 It is important that at each step of the 
intelligence cycle the devil’s advocate be encouraged and allowed to participate in the 
process by asking questions to identify any cognitive biases that may be present.  
The use of a peer review process has been the practice of journal publications for 
many years, with articles submitted for publication subjected to an evaluation for 
accuracy and importance to the field. The New England Journal of Medicine (NEJM) is 
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one of the most prestigious and respected journals in the world and it employs a rigorous 
peer review process to maintain its reputation. That peer review process includes editorial 
review, peer review by two subject matter experts, statistical review, additional review by 
an editor, and finally approval from an editor-in-chief.190 This process may be more 
intensive than required by the IC, but it does provide a solid foundation for a peer review 
process that could be constructed to identify the presence of cognitive biases during the 
analysis process. 
Alternative analysis techniques, such as the use of red teams, devil’s advocate, 
and peer review, have existed for many years, and they provide opportunities for external 
reviewers to identify and account for the effects of cognitive bias during each of the 
intelligence cycle steps. Additionally, these strategies are currently available to the IC. 
Although these processes require the use of additional personnel, the use of these 
techniques would be an efficient and effective strategy to take advantage of the power of 
people who have an expertise in the analysis process and yet may not share the same 
cognitive limitations as other analysts or experts. In addition, analysts are unable to 
identify personal biases, and these strategies present opportunities to identify those 
potential roadblocks to effective analysis.  
2. External Analysis 
Dr. Yetiv provides recommendations on de-biasing techniques that could assist in 
avoiding the influences of cognitive bias. The first technique described is self-
awareness.191 Training that creates bias awareness can be a positive de-biasing technique 
to teach intelligence analysts how to recognize biases and the potential consequences of 
allowing those biases to influence intelligence analysis.192 Although there are 
opportunities where this strategy might be effective, cognitive biases are subconscious, 
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and humans may not be aware of these cognitive limitations or the negative effects on the 
intelligence cycle. Self-awareness is important but is certainly open to continued errors.  
A second approach to de-biasing is to externalize the decision-making process 
through the use of formal procedures.193 This technique would be a similar strategy to the 
use of a structured analytical technique (SAT).194 Externalizing the intelligence analysis 
process provides an opportunity to consider alternative hypotheses, encourages a more 
robust collection of information, allows for an independent review of the intelligence 
analysis process to identify the presence of biases, and presents an opportunity for that 
independent analyst to play devil’s advocate.195  
Furthermore, externalizing the analysis process would force the intelligence 
analyst to list all assumptions at the beginning of the intelligence cycle process. As the 
analyst proceeds through the intelligence cycle steps, the process of continuing to list all 
assumptions remains until the analyst is ready to disseminate the intelligence product. An 
independent reviewer then has the opportunity to review the assumptions and analysis 
searching for the presence of cognitive biases. 
3. Structured Analytical Technique 
Many sources in the literature cited the importance of the use of a structured 
analytical technique (SAT) during the intelligence analysis process. One such SAT was 
identified in an article titled “The Lockwood Analytical Method for Prediction (LAMP) 
within a Probabilistic Framework” in which the author notes, the “sequential and cyclical 
arrangement of the intelligence cycle.”196 Additionally, the article discusses the 
importance of the externalization of the mental framework used by the intelligence 
analyst to mitigate the effects of cognitive bias. This is a very important step in any 
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effective structured intelligence model to allow for an independent review of the 
intelligence product to provide opportunities to identify any cognitive biases that may be 
present in the analysis.197 The LAMP potentially assists in mitigating the limitations of 
cognitive bias by externalizing the intelligence analysis process. Furthermore, this is a 
transparent process that allows for an outside reviewer to understand how the intelligence 
analyst developed the intelligence product. 
A CIA white paper titled A Tradecraft Primer: Structured Analytic Techniques 
for Improving Intelligence Analysis highlights how a SAT can assist intelligence analysts 
to “challenge judgments, identify mental mindsets, stimulate creativity, and manage 
uncertainty.”198 There are many influencing factors within intelligence analysis based on 
current organizational climate, politics, ambiguous data, globalization, and the limitations 
of the human mind.199 A strategy that forces an intelligence analyst to challenge 
hypotheses and provides for an opportunity for the independent analyst to challenge 
another analyst’s hypothesis would be invaluable. 
4. Analyst Teams 
In 2005, Philip Tetlock and Dan Garner’s book Superforecasting: The Art and 
Science of Prediction presented a groundbreaking study involving thousands of ordinary 
people attempting to forecast future events. This research supports the fact that teams of 
forecasters were approximately 23 percent more accurate than individual analysts.200 This 
is very relevant research and important in understanding the value of analyst teams as 
opposed to the current strategy of employing intelligence analysts who work alone. In 
Tetlock and Garner’s study, the participants worked in groups and were provided the 
opportunity to evaluate each other’s assumptions, were made aware of groupthink, and 
provided with strategies to avoid it. Crowd-sourcing success, or using analyst teams, can 
                                                 
197 Ibid., 85. 
198 Central Intelligence Agency, A Tradecraft Primer, 1.  
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200 Philip Tetlock and Dan Gardner, Superforecasting: The Art and Science of Prediction (New York: 
Crown Publishing Group, 2015), 201. 
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simply be explained by the fact that knowledge is often dispersed among many different 
people; no one person can know everything.201  
The author discusses the importance of remaining flexible and open to new 
information during the process of gathering information as well as the relevance of being 
willing to adjust the hypothesis as the information changes. Humans will learn from their 
mistakes as long as there is awareness a mistake occurred. In this study, the people who 
performed the best were cautious, humble, open minded, curious, enjoyed cognitive 
challenges, were good with numbers, were analytical, understood the value in alternative 
views, were not afraid to change their minds, and understood cognitive biases.202 These 
would be valuable character traits to consider during the process of employing 
intelligence analysts.  
In summary, Tetlock and Garner’s significant research discovered the following 
factors to improved predictions: high intelligence is a benefit, subject matter expertise is 
valuable, practice improves accuracy, teams outperform individuals, open minded people 
perform better, training can guard against cognitive biases, and revising predictions based 
on new information improves results.203 Tetlock and Garner’s research presents the IC 
with opportunities for significant improvement to the intelligence analysis process. 
According to the authors of “Psychology of Intelligence Analysis: Drivers of 
Prediction Accuracy in World Politics,” teams of analysts are more effective than 
individuals, and civilians without any formal intelligence background can be trained to be 
effective forecasters.204 The researchers from the University of Pennsylvania organized 
an exercise from 2011 through 2013 that sought predictions for 199 world events of 
interest to the IC. As an example, those events included deciding whether or not North 
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Korea would attempt another nuclear weapons test between a specific period of time and 
whether Moody’s would lower Greece’s debt rating by a specific date.205 
According to the study results, teams performed better than individuals by 10 
percent, and the participants who received training during the study performed better than 
average when that training included methods to mitigate the effects of cognitive bias.206 
In addition, the top performers in the study scored higher on intelligence and knowledge 
of world politics were open to all possibilities as outcomes, excelled following specific 
training/working in an open and collaborative team, and were provided with strategies to 
mitigate the effects of cognitive bias.207 Moreover, this study showed with proper 
education and training intelligence analysts could be very successful as defined in this 
study by anticipating future world events. 
D. TECHNOLOGICAL STRATEGIES  
The use of use of serious games for intelligence analysts is relatively new strategy 
showing great promise in mitigating the effects of cognitive bias present during the 
intelligence analysis process. The ODNI is working with its research partner, IARPA, in 
the creation of games that could be used to teach intelligence analysts how to recognize 
and mitigate cognitive biases.208 The objective is to develop games that can be 
manipulated by changing the variables in order to teach the intelligence analyst to engage 
the cognitive process (system 2) resulting in the recognition and mitigation of cognitive 
biases.209 The study identified the cognitive biases having the greatest impact on 
intelligence analysis to include confirmation bias and anchoring bias consistent with this 
thesis research. 
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Intelligence analysts are responsible for working with information from many 
sources while under the constant pressure to produce actionable intelligence products.210 
IARPA recognized that the current intelligence analysis process does not provide the 
intelligence analyst with the structure to mitigate the effects of cognitive biases,211 and 
that gap in analysis could result in missed weak signals.  
In response to this identified gap in analysis, the University of Oklahoma, with 
funding provided by IARPA, developed a game called Mitigating Analyst Cognitive Bias 
by Eliminating Task Heuristics (MACBETH).212 The strategy of this interactive game 
requires the analyst to collect and analyze intelligence data to stop a terrorist attack 
located at an imaginary place. The MACBETH research study resulted in very little loss 
of the recognition of biases eight weeks after playing the game for one hour or less, and 
this confirmed the de-biasing effect remained largely intact following participation in the 
program.213 In addition, this study suggests that repeated play and for a longer time could 
increase the de-biasing effects as a result of MACBETH game playing. When compared 
with simple de-biasing training, such as viewing a training video, MACBETH was much 
more effective in teaching intelligence analysts about the effects of cognitive biases.214 
A new strategy to mitigate the influences of bias and predispositions is the 
Simulation of Intelligence Analysis (SINTELLA) program.215 This research project is 
funded by the Australian government and Macquarie University. The research began with 
the recognition that effective intelligence analysis is influenced by biases and cognitive 
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predispositions.216 The project targets the gathering and interpretation steps of the 
intelligence analysis process (collection, exploitation, analysis) with the understanding 
that intelligence activities require assessments made under the umbrella of uncertainty.217 
The SINTELLA program requires participants to complete analytical tasks and 
threat assessments by accessing a standardized database, then author a report making 
judgments based on the information provided.218 The software records search behaviors, 
including information viewed, sequence of viewing, time viewed, copied materials, 
decisions made, and final reports.219 According to this research study, the early results 
are positive, and the program holds great promise for the future. Furthermore, the 
SINTELLA program may provide the IC with a resource to evaluate, train, and develop 
intelligence analysts by providing them with the ability to recognize cognitive biases and 
predispositions. 
A mitigation strategy being developed in conjunction with the Office of Naval 
Research (ONR) Collaborative Knowledge Interoperability (CKI) program is a 
networked collaborative intelligence analysis tool called the Joint Intelligence Graphical 
Situation Awareness Web (JIGSAW).220 JIGSAW is based on the theory that a shared 
environment between intelligence analysts will lead to less biased analysis. This is 
consistent with the concept of analyst teams using software to connect analysts in 
different locations. JIGSAW is a web-based technology workspace allowing analysts to 
post and share their assessments of the analysis being completed by other intelligence 
analysts..221  
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Additionally, JIGSAW allows for the exchange of information and reduces biases 
among intelligence analysts who do not know each other by providing opportunities to 
question assumptions while the analysts remain in different locations.222 This type of 
collaborative technology is still under development but holds great promise. Furthermore, 
it has the potential to reduce the effects of cognitive bias on intelligence analysis by 
providing opportunities for intelligence analysts from different IC agencies to work 
together toward a common objective. 
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VI. FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS, CONCLUSION 




A. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH 
This research has provided a historical understanding of the intelligence activities 
of the U.S. that resulted in the development of the intelligence cycle. The intelligence 
cycle has remained relatively unchanged, despite the fact that the threats against the U.S. 
have changed significantly. The research has provided an understanding of the training 
intelligence analysts currently receive. Additionally, the effects of cognitive bias have 
been presented from the perspective of the IC, the private sector, and academia to provide 
context and different viewpoints on the issue. 
Moreover, this research has provided a historical perspective regarding the 
identification of cognitive bias, including the resulting psychological definition, which 
remains in place today. The research has also supported the relevance of cognitive bias 
awareness and why it is important to the IC. Human cognitive performance was 
researched and the difference between intuitive and analytical thinking was explored, and 
it was explained why it is important to understand the difference. In addition, 
confirmation bias and anchoring bias were identified as the most relevant cognitive biases 
influencing intelligence analysis and, more specifically, the intelligence cycle. 
This thesis has also analyzed the intelligence cycle and identified it as a system 
that includes opportunities for cognitive bias creep at every step. NIEs were included in 
this research because they are susceptible to cognitive bias and represent the end product 
of the intelligence cycle. Also, this thesis analyzed the tragic killings of U.S. personnel at 
Benghazi, and it inferred the negative effects of cognitive bias resulted in faulty 
intelligence assessments before and after the event’s occurrence. This thesis also includes 
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a study of the IIC resulting in the identification of strategies employed to combat the 
effects of cognitive bias and/or groupthink during the intelligence analysis process. 
Cognitive bias mitigation strategies from many different sources were researched, 
identified, and separated between psychological solutions, analytical solutions, and 
technological solutions. Some of these strategies have been tested and have proven to be 
effective in reducing the effects of cognitive bias. Many of these strategies are available 
to the IC now, and some are emerging and will be available in the future. All of the 
mitigation strategies present the IC with opportunities to decrease the influences of 
cognitive bias on the intelligence cycle. 
This thesis supports the hypothesis that the intelligence cycle is indeed influenced 
by cognitive bias. Additionally, the research supports the fact that humans do not have 
the ability to self-identify when those cognitive biases are influencing intelligence 
analysis and decision making. This is a significant concern for the IC, which is tasked 
with providing the intelligence required to protect this country. However, all is not lost, 
and there is hope. Mitigation strategies are available to the IC today, and there are 
additional emerging strategies that will be available in the near future. Many of these 
strategies are not only very promising but are relevant to the specific activities required 
during the difficult process of separating the signals from the noise. The employment of 
these strategies will decrease the influence of cognitive bias on the intelligence cycle and 
increase the resilience of the IC.   
B. FINDINGS 
The intelligence cycle has remained unchanged since its inception following the 
end of WWII; however, the threats faced by the IC today are very different from the 
threats of the past. Unlike the intelligence environment during the Cold War, the threats 
of today do not necessarily involve nations or states; rather, they often involve terrorist 
organizations with allegiance to no single nation or state and no specific boundaries. 
These dynamic threats require enhanced intelligence analysis providing accountability for 
the limitations of human cognitive performance.  
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The study of the human cognitive reasoning process and associated biases 
remains relatively new. Recognizing that cognitive biases influence our decision-making 
process, these findings indicate a lack of formal acknowledgement of that fact by the IC, 
and no identified changes to the intelligence cycle in attempt to mitigate those effects. In 
addition, the IC continues to provide very little cognitive bias training to new intelligence 
analysts, and there is no evidence of any recurring training regarding the effects of 
cognitive bias to analysts deployed within the IC.  
Finally, this thesis provides evidence that the effects of cognitive bias do in fact 
influence the intelligence cycle in a negative manner. The IC is in a position to take 
advantage of identified mitigation strategies to decrease those negative effects resulting 
in a more resilient intelligence cycle leading to more effective intelligence analysis. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The first step in improving the intelligence analysis process should be formal 
recognition by the DNI that the effects of cognitive bias do in fact influence the 
intelligence cycle in a negative manner. Formal recognition by the leadership of the IC 
would serve as a catalyst for change and the only real possibility for significant changes 
to the IC practices. Any recommendations for change will require significant funding and 
resources. Perhaps that funding could be used by the DNI as incentive to influence the IC 
to explore and implement recommended changes. This researcher recommends the 
following to the IC: 
1. Establish a diverse working group comprised of representatives from 
throughout the IC, including SMEs from outside the government to 
evaluate and explore potential mitigation strategies available today and in 
the future.  
2. Training for the IC should be consistent and at regular intervals include 
significant education on the effects of cognitive bias and strategies to 
decrease those effects.  
3. Improve the critical thinking skills of analysts through recurring education 
and training that is on the cutting edge of cognitive psychology.  
4. Explore the concept of analyst teams as opposed individual analysts to 
assist with the identification of cognitive biases.  
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5. Revisit the intelligence cycle and determine if a more structured analytic 
technique would lead to improved intelligence analysis.  
6. Intelligence analysts should be required to document all assumptions to 
provide opportunities for an external analysis.  
7. Intelligence analysts should be required to include alternative assessments 
depending on variables.  
Any changes to the intelligence analysis process should be documented in 
performance appraisals so that IC managers are aware of the requirements and can hold 
analysts accountable to those standards. In addition, decision makers should be provided 
access to all of the intelligence utilized in the intelligence product to be provided 
opportunities to ask for clarification. 
D. CONCLUSION 
This research supports the fact that cognitive bias is very much a concern in the 
government, public sector, private sectors, academia, and the social sciences. This 
research and thesis supports the hypothesis that cognitive bias has a negative effect on the 
intelligence cycle. The significance of this research impacts U.S. national security, and 
the IC cannot allow the negative effects of cognitive bias to influence the intelligence 
analysis process. Missing weak signals leads to intelligence analysis failures resulting in 
tragedies and the loss of lives here at home and abroad. The complexity of today’s fight 
against terrorism demands the IC’s best efforts in this dynamic environment. The U.S. 
needs resilient intelligence programs providing analysts with the tools and training in 
order to be effective and successful. This research resulted in the identification of 
cognitive bias mitigation strategy recommendations that will release the cognitive 
limitations of those biases.    
The ODNI recently released the National Counterintelligence Strategy of the 
United States of America 2016, which includes recommendations that the IC focus efforts 
on anticipating, identifying, and warning of emerging threats.223 One of the 
recommendations is the development of relevant educational programs and opportunities 
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that will assist with the identification of those threats.224 The topic of this thesis is 
consistent with our most recent national counterintelligence strategy and provides an 
opportunity to contribute to our nation’s security. This thesis presents the IC with 
recommendations to strengthen our nation’s intelligence analysis effectiveness in order to 
better protect this nation and our interests abroad. This research presents the IC with an 
opportunity to release the cognitive binds that blind us.   
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APPENDIX A.  LIST OF COGNITIVE BIASES 
(RELEVANT TO IC) 
Table 2.   Cognitive Biases Relevant to the IC225 
COGNITIVE BIAS DEFINITION 
Anchoring Tendency to rely on past reference or information when making 
decisions or judgments 
Attribution Tendency to explain the actions of others or events 
Availability heuristic Tendency to estimate the likelihood of an event if it is more 
available in memory 
Backfire effect Tendency to react to disconfirming evidence by strengthening 
their beliefs or position 
Bandwagon effect Tendency to increase adoption of an idea, etc. based on 
proportion who have already done so 
Base Rate fallacy Tendency to base judgments on specifics while ignoring general 
statistical information 
Belief bias Tendency to evaluate the logic of an argument depending on the 
believability of the conclusion 
Biased assimilation Tendency to interpret information in a manner, which supports 
the desired conclusion 
Choice supportive bias Tendency to retroactively ascribe positive attributes to an option 
one has already selected 
Commission bias Tendency toward action rather than inaction despite not having 
all information 
Confirmation bias Tendency to regard information, which supports a pre-
established opinion 
Conjunction fallacy Tendency to assume that specific conditions are more probable 
than a single, general one 
Conservatism Tendency to retain prior views at the expense of acknowledging 
                                                 
225 Adapted from European Commission, European Union Seventh Framework Programme, 
“Reduction of Cognitive Biases in Intelligence Analysis,” accessed April 19, 2016, 
http://recobia.atosresearch.eu/recopedia/index.php/Category:Cognitive_Biases. 
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COGNITIVE BIAS DEFINITION 
new information exists 
Contrast effect Tendency to enhance or diminish relevance of information when 
compared with more recent, contrasting information 
Disconfirmation bias Tendency to critically scrutinize information that contradicts 
prior beliefs 
Distinction bias Tendency to view two options as more dissimilar when 
evaluating them simultaneously than when evaluating them 
separately 
Expertise bias Tendency to select sources with the highest perceived expertise, 
even if that expertise is not relevant to the question at hand 
False consensus effect Tendency to overestimate the degree to which others agree with 
you based on the self-perception that your beliefs are common 
Familiarity bias Tendency to believe those having a conversation with you are 
more credible than those who are not 
Framing effect Tendency to draw different conclusions from the same 
information depending on context 
Fundamental attribution 
error 
Tendency to over-emphasize personality-based explanations for 
behaviors while under-emphasizing the influences of the 
environment on those behaviors 
Halo effect  Tendency to allow a person’s positive or negative traits to 
influence the perceptions of that person’s character  
Hard-Easy effect Tendency to subjectively perceive the suspected level of 
difficulty of a specific task  
Hindsight effect Tendency to view past events as being predictable at the time 
those events occurred, or view past events through present 
knowledge about them 
Hostile attribution error Tendency to over-emphasize personality-based explanations for 
behaviors in others while under-emphasizing the power of 
environmental influences 
Hostile media effect Tendency to view media reports as biased based on subjective 
personal views 
Illusion of validity Tendency to add credibility to new information that supports the 
data in hand, even if objectively it does not 
  77 
COGNITIVE BIAS DEFINITION 
Illusory correlation Tendency to perceive a relationship between two unrelated 
events and inaccurately recall a relationship between two events 
Mere exposure effect Tendency to view dislike for something based on familiarity 
with it 
Morality as self-interest 
illusion 
Tendency to participate in attempting to solve a dilemma based 
on the inaccurate belief a benefit will be realized in the long run 
Negativity bias Tendency to place more value on negative information rather 
than the positive 
Objectivity bias Tendency to consider people with perceived objectivity more 
credible than others 
Omission Tendency to judge harmful actions as worse or less moral than 
equally harmful inactions 
Optimism bias Tendency to believe we are at less risk of experiencing a 
negative event when compared with others 
Out group homogeneity Tendency to view members of our own group as more varied 
than members of other groups 
Overconfidence effect Tendency to place excessive value on our personal abilities or 
answers to questions 
Parochialism effect Tendency to favor a specific group, or group we belong to, while 
dismissing the effects on others 
Planning fallacy bias Tendency to underestimate the time or resources required to 
complete a task 
Recency effect Tendency to recall the most recent information presented above 
all else 
Selective perception Tendency for expectations to affect perception 
Self-fulfilling prophecy Tendency to engage in behaviors that will elicit results which 
will confirm existing attitudes 
Self-serving bias Tendency to claim more responsibility for successes than 
failures 
Similarity bias Tendency to believe that that people with similar characteristics 
to our own are more credible than others 
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COGNITIVE BIAS DEFINITION 
Stereotyping Tendency to expect a member of a group to possess certain 
characteristics without any actual information about that 
individual 
Student syndrome Tendency to wait until the a deadline approaches to fully engage 
a pending task 
Trait ascription bias Tendency to view ourselves as well-rounded while viewing 
others as predictable 
Ultimate attribution error Tendency to assign an attribute to an entire group instead of the 
individuals 
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APPENDIX B.  LIST OF COGNITIVE BIASES (DECISION 
MAKING, BELIEF, AND BEHAVIORAL) 
Table 3.   Decision Making, Belief, and Behavioral Biases226 
Name Description 
Ambiguity effect The tendency to avoid options for which missing information makes the probability seem unknown 
Anchoring  The tendency to rely too heavily, or “anchor,” on one trait or piece of information when making decisions  
Anthropomorphism 
The tendency to characterize animals, objects, and abstract 
concepts as possessing human-like traits, emotions, and 
intentions  
Attentional bias The tendency of our perception to be affected by our recurring thoughts  
Automation bias 
The tendency to excessively depend on automated 
systems, which can lead to erroneous automated 
information overriding correct decisions  
Availability heuristic 
The tendency to overestimate the likelihood of events with 
greater “availability” in memory, which can be influenced 
by how recent the memories are or how unusual or 
emotionally charged they may be  
Availability cascade 
A self-reinforcing process in which a collective belief 
gains more and more plausibility through its increasing 
repetition in public discourse  
Backfire effect 
When people react to disconfirming evidence by 
strengthening their beliefs  
 
                                                 
226 Adapted from Wikipedia, s.v., “List of Cognitive Biases,” accessed April 28, 2016, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases.  
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Name Description 
Bandwagon effect The tendency to do (or believe) things because many other people do (or believe) the same  
Base rate fallacy  
The tendency to ignore base rate information (generic, 
general information) and focus on specific information 
(information only pertaining to a certain case)  
Belief bias 
An effect where someone’s evaluation of the logical 
strength of an argument is biased by the believability of 
the conclusion  
Bias blind spot 
The tendency to see oneself as less biased than other 
people, or to be able to identify more cognitive biases in 
others than in oneself  
Cheerleader effect  The tendency for people to appear more attractive in a group than in isolation  
Choice-supportive bias The tendency to remember one’s choices as better than they actually were  
Clustering illusion The tendency to overestimate the importance of small runs, streaks, or clusters in large samples of random data  
Confirmation bias 
The tendency to search for, interpret, focus on and 
remember information in a way that confirms one’s 
preconceptions  
Congruence bias The tendency to test hypotheses exclusively through direct testing, instead of testing possible alternative hypotheses  
Conjunction fallacy The tendency to assume that specific conditions are more probable than general ones  
Conservatism (belief 
revision) 
The tendency to revise one’s belief insufficiently when 
presented with new evidence  
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Name Description 
Contrast effect  
The enhancement or reduction of a certain perception’s 
stimuli when compared with a recently observed, 
contrasting object  
Curse of knowledge 
When better-informed people find it extremely difficult to 
think about problems from the perspective of lesser-
informed people  
Declinism 
The belief that a society or institution is tending towards 
decline. Particularly, it is the predisposition to view the 
past favorably and future negatively 
Decoy effect  
Preferences for either option A or B changes in favor of 
option B when option C is presented, which is similar to 
option B but in no way better 
Denomination effect The tendency to spend more money when it is denominated in small amounts  
Disposition effect The tendency to sell an asset that has accumulated in value and resist selling an asset that has declined in value 
Distinction bias 
The tendency to view two options as more dissimilar when 
evaluating them simultaneously than when evaluating 
them separately  
Dunning-Kruger effect 
The tendency for unskilled individuals to overestimate 
their own ability and the tendency for experts to 
underestimate their own ability  
Duration neglect The neglect of the duration of an episode in determining its value 
Empathy gap The tendency to underestimate the influence or strength of feelings in either oneself or others 
Endowment effect The tendency for people to demand much more to give up an object than they would be willing to pay to acquire it  
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Name Description 
Essentialism Categorizing people and things according to their essential nature, in spite of variations  
Exaggerated 
expectation 
Based on the estimates, real-world evidence turns out to 
be less extreme than our expectations  
Experimenter’s or 
expectation bias 
The tendency for experimenters to believe, certify, and 
publish data that agree with their expectations for the 
outcome of an experiment, and to disbelieve, discard, or 
downgrade the corresponding weightings for data that 
appear to conflict with those expectations  
Focusing effect The tendency to place too much importance on one aspect of an event  
Forer effect or Barnum 
effect 
The observation that individuals will give high accuracy 
ratings to descriptions of their personality that supposedly 
are tailored specifically for them, but are in fact vague and 
general enough to apply to a wide range of people 
Framing effect Drawing different conclusions from the same information, depending on how that information is presented 
Frequency illusion 
The illusion in which a word, a name, or other thing that 
has recently come to one’s attention suddenly seems to 
appear with improbable frequency shortly afterwards  
Functional fixedness Limits a person to using an object only in the way it is traditionally used 
Gambler’s fallacy The tendency to think that future probabilities are altered by past events, when in reality they are unchanged 
Hard-easy effect Based on a specific level of task difficulty, the confidence in judgments is too conservative and not extreme enough  
Hindsight bias The tendency to see past events as being predictable
 at the 
time those events happened. 
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Name Description 
Hot-hand fallacy 
The fallacious belief that a person who has experienced 
success with a random event has a greater chance of 
further success in additional attempts 
Hyperbolic discounting 
Discounting is the tendency for people to have a stronger 
preference for more immediate payoffs relative to later 
payoffs  
Identifiable victim effect 
The tendency to respond more strongly to a single 
identified person at risk than to a large group of people at 
risk  
IKEA effect 
The tendency for people to place a disproportionately high 
value on objects that they partially assembled themselves 
(IKEA) 
Illusion of control The tendency to overestimate one’s degree of influence over other external events  
Illusion of validity 
Belief that furtherly acquired information generates 
additional relevant data for predictions, even when it 
evidently does not  
Illusory correlation Inaccurately perceiving a relationship between two unrelated events  
Impact bias The tendency to overestimate the length or the intensity of the impact of future feeling states  
Information bias The tendency to seek information even when it cannot affect action  
Insensitivity to sample 
size The tendency to under-expect variation in small samples 
Irrational escalation 
The phenomenon where people justify increased 
investment in a decision, based on the cumulative prior 
investment, despite new evidence suggesting that the 
decision was probably wrong 
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Name Description 
Less-is-better effect The tendency to prefer a smaller set to a larger set judged separately, but not jointly 
Loss aversion The disutility of giving up an object is greater than the utility associated with acquiring it 
Mere exposure effect The tendency to express undue liking for things merely because of familiarity with them  
Money illusion 
The tendency to concentrate on the nominal value (face 
value) of money rather than its value in terms of 
purchasing power  
Moral credential effect The tendency of a track record of non-prejudice to increase subsequent prejudice 
Negativity effect 
The tendency of people, when evaluating the causes of the 
behaviors of a person they dislike, to attribute their 
positive behaviors to the environment and their negative 
behaviors to the person’s inherent nature 
Negativity bias 
Psychological phenomenon by which humans have a 
greater recall of unpleasant memories compared with 
positive memories  
Neglect of probability The tendency to completely disregard probability when making a decision under uncertainty  
Normalcy bias The refusal to plan for, or react to, a disaster, which has never happened before 
Not invented here Aversion to contact with or use of products, research, standards, or knowledge developed outside a group 
Observer-expectancy 
effect 
When a researcher expects a given result and therefore 
unconsciously manipulates an experiment or misinterprets 
data in order to find it 
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Name Description 
Omission bias The tendency to judge harmful actions as worse, or less moral, than equally harmful omissions (inactions)  
Optimism bias The tendency to be over-optimistic, overestimating favorable and pleasing outcomes  
Ostrich effect Ignoring an obvious (negative) situation. 
Outcome bias 
The tendency to judge a decision by its eventual outcome 
instead of based on the quality of the decision at the time 
it was made 
Overconfidence effect Excessive confidence in one’s own answers to questions 
Pareidolia A vague and random stimulus (often an image or sound) is perceived as significant 
Pessimism bias 
The tendency for some people, especially those suffering 
from depression, to overestimate the likelihood of 
negative things happening to them 
Planning fallacy The tendency to underestimate task-completion times  
Post-purchase 
rationalization 
The tendency to persuade oneself through rational 
argument that a purchase was good value 
Pro-innovation bias 
The tendency to have an excessive optimism towards an 
invention or innovation’s usefulness throughout society, 
while often failing to identify its limitations and 
weaknesses 
Pseudocertainty effect 
The tendency to make risk-averse choices if the expected 
outcome is positive, but make risk-seeking choices to 
avoid negative outcomes  
Reactance 
The urge to do the opposite of what someone wants you to 
do out of a need to resist a perceived attempt to constrain 
your freedom of choice  
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Name Description 
Reactive devaluation Devaluing proposals only because they purportedly originated with an adversary 
Recency illusion The illusion that a word or language usage is a recent innovation when it is in fact long-established  
Regressive bias 
A certain state of mind wherein high values and high 
likelihoods are overestimated while low values and low 
likelihoods are underestimated  
Restraint bias The tendency to overestimate one’s ability to show restraint in the face of temptation 
Rhyme as reason effect 
Rhyming statements are perceived as more truthful. A 
famous example being used in the O.J Simpson trial with 
the defense’s use of the phrase “If the gloves don’t fit, 
then you must acquit.” 
Risk compensation  The tendency to take greater risks when perceived safety increases 
Selective perception The tendency for expectations to affect perception 
Semmelweis reflex The tendency to reject new evidence that contradicts a paradigm  
Social comparison bias 
The tendency, when making hiring decisions, to favor 
potential candidates who do not compete with one’s own 
particular strengths  
Social desirability bias 
The tendency to over-report socially desirable 
characteristics or behaviors in oneself and under-report 
socially undesirable characteristics or behaviors  
Status quo bias The tendency to like things to stay relatively the same  
Stereotyping 
Expecting a member of a group to have certain 
characteristics without having actual information about 
that individual 
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Name Description 
Subadditivity effect The tendency to judge probability of the whole to be less than the probabilities of the parts  
Subjective validation Perception that something is true if a subject’s belief demands it to be true 
Survivorship bias 
Concentrating on the people or things that “survived” 
some process and inadvertently overlooking those that did 
not because of their lack of visibility 
Time-saving bias 
Underestimations of the time that could be saved (or lost) 
when increasing (or decreasing) from a relatively low 
speed and overestimations of the time that could be saved 
(or lost) when increasing (or decreasing) from a relatively 
high speed 
Third-person effect Belief that mass communicated media messages have a greater effect on others than on themselves 
Triviality / Parkinson’s 
Law of 
The tendency to give disproportionate weight to trivial 
issues 
Unit bias The tendency to want to finish a given unit of a task  
Weber–Fechner law Difficulty in comparing small differences in large quantities 
Well-traveled road 
effect 
Underestimation of the duration taken to traverse oft-
traveled routes and overestimation of the duration taken to 
traverse less familiar routes 
Zero-risk bias Preference for reducing a small risk to zero over a greater reduction in a larger risk 
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Table 4.   Social Biases227 
Name Description 
Actor–observer bias  
The tendency for explanations of other individuals’ 
behaviors to overemphasize the influence of their 




Attributing more blame to a harm-doer as the outcome 
becomes more severe or as personal or 
situational similarity to the victim increases 
Egocentric bias 
Occurs when people claim more responsibility for 
themselves for the results of a joint action than an 
outside observer would credit them with 
Extrinsic incentives bias 
When people view others as having (situational) 
extrinsic motivations and (dispositional) intrinsic 
motivations for oneself 
False consensus effect The tendency for people to overestimate the degree to which others agree with them  
Forer effect  
The tendency to give high accuracy ratings to 
descriptions of their personality that supposedly are 
tailored specifically for them, but are in fact vague and 
general enough to apply to a wide range of people  
Fundamental attribution 
error  
The tendency for people to over-emphasize 
personality-based explanations for behaviors observed 
in others while under-emphasizing the role and power 
of situational influences on the same behavior  
 
Group attribution error 
The biased belief that the characteristics of an 
individual group member are reflective of the group as 
a whole or the tendency to assume that group decision 
                                                 
227 Adapted from Wikipedia, s.v., “List of Cognitive Biases,” accessed April 28, 2016, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases. 
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Name Description 
outcomes reflect the preferences of group members, 
even when information is available that clearly 
suggests otherwise 
Halo effect 
The tendency for a person’s positive or negative traits 
to “spill over” from one personality area to another in 
others’ perceptions of them  
Illusion of asymmetric insight People perceive their knowledge of their peers to surpass their peers’ knowledge of them  
Illusion of external agency 
When people view self-generated preferences as 
instead being caused by insightful, effective and 
benevolent agents 
Illusion of transparency People overestimate others ability to know them, and they also overestimate their ability to know others 
Illusory superiority 
Overestimating one’s desirable qualities, and 
underestimating undesirable qualities, relative to other 
people 
In-group bias 
The tendency for people to give preferential treatment 
to others they perceive to be members of their own 
groups 
Just-world hypothesis 
The tendency for people to want to believe that the 
world is fundamentally just, causing them to 
rationalize an otherwise inexplicable injustice as 
deserved by the victim(s) 
Moral luck  The tendency for people to ascribe greater or lesser moral standing based on the outcome of an event 
Naïve cynicism 
Expecting more egocentric bias in others than in 
oneself 
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Name Description 
Naïve realism 
The belief that we see reality as it really is, objectively 
and without bias; that the facts are plain for all to see; 
that rational people will agree with us; and that those 
who do not are either uninformed, lazy, irrational, or 
biased 
Outgroup homogeneity bias Individuals see members of their own group as being relatively more varied than members of other groups  
Projection bias 
The tendency to unconsciously assume that others (or 
one’s future selves) share one’s current emotional 
states, thoughts and values  
Self-serving bias The tendency to claim more responsibility for successes than failures  
Shared information bias 
The tendency for group members to spend more time 
and energy discussing information that all members 
are already familiar with (i.e., shared information), and 
less time and energy discussing information that only 
some members are aware of (i.e., unshared 
information)  
System justification  The tendency to defend and bolster the status quo 
Trait ascription bias 
The tendency for people to view themselves as 
relatively variable in terms of personality, behavior, 
and mood while viewing others as much more 
predictable 
Ultimate attribution error 
Similar to the fundamental attribution error, in this 
error a person is likely to make an internal attribution 
to an entire group instead of the individuals within the 
group 
Worse-than-average effect  A tendency to believe ourselves to be worse than others at tasks that are difficult  
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Table 5.   Memory Errors and Biases228 
Name Description 
Bizarreness effect  Bizarre material is better remembered than common material 
Choice-supportive bias 
In a self-justifying manner retroactively ascribing 
one’s choices to be more informed than they were 
when they were made 
Change bias 
After an investment of effort in producing change, 
remembering one’s past performance as more 
difficult than it actually was  
Childhood amnesia The retention of few memories from before the age of four 
Conservatism or regressive bias 
Tendency to remember high values and high 
likelihoods/probabilities/frequencies as lower than 
they actually were and low ones as higher than 
they actually were  
Consistency bias 
Incorrectly remembering one’s past attitudes and 
behavior as resembling present attitudes and 
behavior  
Context effect  
That cognition and memory are dependent on 
context, such that out-of-context memories are 
more difficult to retrieve than in-context memories  
Cross-race effect  
The tendency for people of one race to have 
difficulty identifying members of a race other than 
their own 
Cryptomnesia  
A form of misattribution where a memory is 
mistaken for imagination, because there is no 
subjective experience of it being a memory  
                                                 
228 Adapted from Wikipedia, s.v., “List of Cognitive Biases,” accessed April 28, 2016, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_cognitive_biases. 
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Name Description 
Egocentric bias Recalling the past in a self-serving manner 
Fading affect bias 
A bias in which the emotion associated with 
unpleasant memories fades more quickly than the 
emotion associated with positive events  
False memory  A form of misattribution where imagination is mistaken for a memory 
Generation effect  That self-generated information is remembered best 
Google effect  
The tendency to forget information that can be 
found readily online by using Internet search 
engines 
Hindsight bias The inclination to see past events as being more predictable than they actually were 
Humor effect That humorous items are more easily remembered than non-humorous ones 
Illusion of truth effect 
That people are more likely to identify as true 
statements those they have previously heard, 
regardless of the actual validity of the statement 
Illusory correlation  Inaccurately remembering a relationship between two events  
Leveling and sharpening 
Memory distortions introduced by the loss of 
details in a recollection over time, often concurrent 
with sharpening or selective recollection of certain 
details that take on exaggerated significance in 
relation to the details or aspects of the experience 
lost through leveling 
Levels-of-processing effect  That different methods of encoding information into memory have different levels of effectiveness  
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Name Description 
List-length effect 
A smaller percentage of items are remembered in a 
longer list, but as the length of the list increases, 
the absolute number of items remembered 
increases as well  
Misinformation effect Memory becoming less accurate because of interference from post-event information  
Modality effect 
That memory recall is higher for the last items of a 
list when the list items were received via speech 
than when they were received through writing 
Mood-congruent memory bias The improved recall of information congruent with one’s current mood 
Next-in-line effect 
That a person in a group has diminished recall for 
the words of others who spoke immediately before 
himself, if they take turns speaking  
Part-list cueing effect  
That being shown some items from a list and later 
retrieving one item causes it to become harder to 
retrieve the other items  
Peak–end rule  
That people seem to perceive not the sum of an 
experience but the average of how it was at its 
peak 
Persistence The unwanted recurrence of memories of a traumatic event  
Picture superiority effect  
The notion that concepts that are learned by 
viewing pictures are more easily and frequently 
recalled than are concepts that are learned by 
viewing their written word form counterparts  
Positivity effect  
That older adults favor positive over negative 
information in their memories 
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Name Description 
Primacy/recency effect  
That items near the end of a sequence are the 
easiest to recall, followed by the items at the 
beginning of a sequence; items in the middle are 
the least likely to be remembered  
Processing difficulty effect 
That information that takes longer to read and is 
thought about more (processed with more 
difficulty) is more easily remembered  
Reminiscence bump  
The recalling of more personal events from 
adolescence and early adulthood than personal 
events from other lifetime periods 
Rosy retrospection  The remembering of the past as having been better than it really was 
Self-relevance effect That memories relating to the self are better recalled than similar information relating to others 
Source confusion Confusing episodic memories with other information, creating distorted memories  
Spacing effect 
That information is better recalled if exposure to it 
is repeated over a long span of time rather than a 
short one 
Spotlight effect The tendency to overestimate the amount that other people notice your appearance or behavior 
Stereotypical bias Memory distorted towards stereotypes  
Suffix effect 
Diminishment of the recency effect because a 
sound item is appended to the list that the subject 
is not required to recall  
Suggestibility 
A form of misattribution where ideas suggested by 
a questioner are mistaken for memory 
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Name Description 
Telescoping effect 
The tendency to displace recent events backward 
in time and remote events forward in time, so that 
recent events appear more remote, and remote 
events, more recent 
Testing effect 
The fact that you more easily remember 
information you have read by rewriting it instead 
of rereading it  
Tip of the tongue effect 
When a subject is able to recall parts of an item, or 
related information, but is frustratingly unable to 
recall the whole item  
Travis syndrome Overestimating the significance of the present  
Verbatim effect That the “gist” of what someone has said is better remembered than the verbatim wording  
Von Restorff effect That an item that sticks out is more likely to be remembered than other items 
Zeigarnik effect That uncompleted or interrupted tasks are remembered better than completed ones 
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